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The General Allotment Act, or Dawes Severalty Act, passed in 1887, had terrible 
repercussions for the Native American. Although the negative effects of the Act were 
widespread across the entire country, the separate impacts on individual reservations 
varied. On the Omaha and Winnebago Reservations in northeastern Nebraska, the 
Indians faced an entirely new range of problems after allotment, problems which 
continue to complicate the lives of residents even today. Whites not only purchased 
“surplus” lands, but also sought to appropriate the allotted land through dubious leasing 
schemes.
The citizenship clause in the Dawes Act was particularly perplexing. Ostensibly, 
the Act granted citizenship to allotted Indians and placed them under the protection of the 
laws of the state in which they resided, while the United States Government retained title 
to the land held in trust. The difficulty stemmed from the ambiguous new status of the 
allotted Indian. Did the citizenship clause necessarily sever the existing tribal 
relationship between the tribes and the federal government? Did jurisdiction over the 
Indians now fall within state domain, or did it remain under the federal government?
Advocates of free-leasing between whites and Indians on the reservations claimed 
it was the former, while the Indian Office clung to the latter interpretation. In the first 
few years immediately following the passage of the Act, the Indian Bureau proved 
agonizingly slow in response to the inquiries of its agents regarding the matter. Eager 
whites were not so hesitant and, by the time the Indian Office had issued its official 
stance on leasing, whites were already in possession of much of the allotted land.
The ambiguous citizenship clause in the Dawes Act had provided the means for 
unscrupulous whites to take full advantage of the Indians. For its part, the Indian Office 
was not completely unaware of what had happened. Indeed, when a new agent arrived in 
the summer of 1893, the Commissioner’s instructions to him were clear -  root out and 
destroy the pervasive system of illegal leasing and reassert agency supervision over the 
tribes. This study traces the origins of .the leasing problems on the Omaha and 
Winnebago Reservations following the Dawes Act and reconstructs the confrontation that 
ensued between the agent and the free-leasing factions. In the process, it illustrates not 
only another dark chapter in Indian-white relations in this country, but also demonstrates 
the need for caution in the appraisal of the roles and reputations of the Indian agents.
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INTRODUCTION
“ . . . With this new policy [allotment under the Dawes Severalty Act] will arise new 
perplexities to be solved and new obstacles to be overcome which will tax the wisdom, 
patience, and courage of all interested in and working for Indian advancement.”
John D. C. Atkins 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
Annual Report 1887
Congress passed the General Allotment Act, or Dawes Severalty Act, on February 
7, 1887.1 The act, which granted land in severalty to individual Indian allottees, was 
intended to individualize, “civilize” and Christianize the Indian. Advocates of the 
legislation hoped that private ownership of land would help to acculturate Indians to the 
white man’s ways. However, many unforeseen and detrimental effects quickly 
manifested themselves in the years following passage of the law. Ironically, this 
proposed solution to the “Indian problem” was itself the source of additional calamities, 
especially those associated with the alienation of Native lands despite the act’s provision 
for a twenty-five year government trust period designed to prevent transfer of allotments 
to non-Indians. The leasing controversy on the Omaha and Winnebago Reservations 
illustrates how white “land grabbers” twisted the intent and spirit of the citizenship clause 
in the Dawes Act to facilitate this alienation.
Omaha allotment actually predated passage of the Dawes Severalty Act. When 
the tribe ceded its traditional hunting grounds to the federal government in 1854, it 
agreed to settle on 300,000 acres in the northeastern comer of present-day Nebraska.
2Article Six stipulated that in the future reservation land could be surveyed and assigned to 
individual Indians. In 1865, however, the Omaha agreed to sell the northern portion of 
their reservation to the federal government, which intended to settle 1200 Winnebago 
refugees there. Article Four of this new treaty, which superseded the arrangements 
made in 1854, changed the conditions under which allotments would be made. Since in 
most cases the new terms reduced the amount of land the Omahas would receive, they 
protested at first, but eventually agreed to the less advantageous terms of the 1865 treaty.4 
The U. S. land office finished the reservation survey work early in the summer of 1867 
and the Indian agent completed the allotments by 1871.5 Although the Omahas received 
certificates of allotment in that year, the certificates did not grant actual title to the land.6
On August 7, 1882, Congress passed the Omaha Allotment Act. Section One of 
the act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to sell the portion of the Omaha 
reservation that lay to the west of the Sioux City and Nebraska Railroad line. Subsequent 
sections announced that the land ceded would be open to white settlement and that all 
proceeds from the sale of that land would be placed into a fund for the benefit of the 
Omahas, to be expended at the Secretary of the Interior’s discretion. The act apportioned 
allotments according to the following formula: 160 acres to each head of household; 
eighty acres to each single adult over eighteen years of age; eighty acres to each orphan 
under eighteen years of age; and forty acres to each child under eighteen years o f age. 
This new allotment schedule superseded the terms of the 1865 Treaty and also gave 
Indians who already held certificates under the 1871 allotment process the first
3opportunity to re-select the same land for their allotment under the later Act. Once the
n
Indians selected new allotments, their old certificates became “null and void.”
The Omaha Allotment Act of 1882 carefully spelled out the conditions under 
which the patents to the land would operate. Only after the Secretary of the Interior 
approved the individual allotments would patents be issued. The patents would 
specifically declare that “ . . . the United States does and will hold the land thus allotted 
for the period of twenty-five years in trust for the sole use and benefit o f  the Indians to 
whom such allotment shall have been made. . .” [my emphasis]. Only after the twenty- 
five year trust period had expired would the Indians receive free and clear patent to their 
land. Furthermore, the same section explicitly stated that “ . . .  if any conveyance shall be 
made of the lands . . .  or any contract made touching the same before the expiration of 
the time above mentioned, such conveyance or contract shall be absolutely null and 
vo id ’ [my emphasis]. These clauses were specifically included to protect the Indians
o
from white men.
Section Seven of the Omaha Allotment Act of 1882 did not specifically grant 
citizenship to the Omahas, but it did subject them to the civil and criminal laws of the 
State of Nebraska. Furthermore, it stipulated that any land lying east of the Sioux City 
and Nebraska Railroad line which remained after all the allotments had been selected was 
to be patented to and held collectively by the Omaha tribe. This tribal land enjoyed the 
same protection under the twenty-five year trust period that the individual allotments did. 
Each child subsequently bom into the tribe during the twenty-five year period was 
entitled to an allotment from the tribal land under these same conditions.9
4The Winnebagos also experienced allotment before the passage of the Dawes 
Severalty Act. Although a relatively small number of tribal members remained behind 
when ordered to leave their homelands in Wisconsin in 1838, the majority resettled on a 
reservation in Minnesota ten years later. Not long after Minnesota became a state in 
1858, delegates from the Minnesota Winnebagos signed a treaty with the United States in 
which they agreed to accept allotments in severalty and sell their surplus reservation land 
to whites.10 The treaty, signed on April 15, 1859, declared that each head of family 
would receive no more than eighty acres, and each single male over eighteen years of age 
would receive no more than forty acres. Once the Secretary of the Interior approved the 
allotments, he would issue to the Indians certificates that expressly guaranteed that these 
lands were for their “exclusive use and benefit.” Furthermore, as a precaution against 
alienation, the treaty expressly forbade the leasing of the land except under the guidance 
of the Department of the Interior, and then only to the United States or to other members 
of the tribe. Finally, the land was to be exempt from taxation, levy, sale, or forfeiture 
until further notice by Congress.11
It was not long, however, before public pressure prompted Congress to relocate 
the Winnebagos. The Act of February 21, 1863, authorized the president to remove all 
tribal members from their reservation in Minnesota and to place them on “unoccupied 
land beyond the limits of any State.”12 Although the act stated that the new reservation 
was supposed to include land “well adapted for agricultural purposes,” the Winnebagos 
found themselves exiled on the barren and infertile Crow Creek Reservation in the 
Territory of Dakota. As many as a third of the tribe succumbed to starvation and
5i  n
exposure that winter. In the spring, the survivors fled south and sought refuge among 
the Omahas. During the following year, the Winnebagos eagerly gave up their existing 
reservation land in Dakota Territory in exchange for land recently ceded by the 
Omahas.14 Although the 1865 Treaty with the Winnebago made no mention concerning 
allotments on their new reservation in Nebraska Territory, the 1863 act clearly intended 
that the Winnebagos be allotted once they were settled on their new reservation. It also 
subjected these Indians to the laws of the United States and also to the criminal laws of 
the state or territory in which they resided. In addition, the Winnebagos remained subject 
to the rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior. Furthermore, it 
specifically prohibited them from making valid contracts with anyone except other 
Indians without the permission of the president. Under the provisions of this act, the 
Department of the Interior issued 420 patents to the Winnebagos by 1872.15
By the time that the Dawes Severalty Act passed Congress in 1887, both the 
Omaha and Winnebago tribes already had substantial experience with the allotment 
process. While much of the wording in the Dawes Act was similar to previous specific 
legislation for these two tribes, there were some important differences. The amount of 
land prescribed for each recipient under the Dawes Severalty Act was identical to the 
Omaha allotment schedule under the 1882 legislation: each head of family received 160 
acres; single persons over eighteen and orphans under eighteen each received eighty 
acres; and each child under eighteen received forty acres. Although this meant no 
increase for the Omahas, it effectively doubled the size of Winnebago entitlements from 
what they had been under the 1859 act. Indians who currently enjoyed terms that were
6more generous than provided for in the Dawes Act were permitted to retain that benefit. 
The Dawes Act increased but did not diminish the size o f allotments.16
The Dawes Act likewise repeated the now familiar protective twenty-five year 
trust period during which Indians were entitled to the “sole use and benefit” of their 
allotment. It is interesting to note, however, that lawmakers had included a phrase 
granting the president permission to extend the trust period at his discretion. Apparently 
there were doubts among some in Washington that twenty-five years was enough time for 
the Indians to advance far enough along the white man’s road to be competent to take 
care of themselves. One stipulation also explicitly warned that any conveyance or 
contract involving the allotments within the trust period were immediately considered 
“absolutely null and void.”17
By far the most radical part o f the Dawes Act was Section Six, which declared 
allotted Indians to be citizens of the United States and “ . . . entitled to all the rights, 
privileges, and immunities” as any other citizen. Accordingly, Indian citizenship was 
not official until “the completion of said allotments and the patenting of the lands to said 
allottees.” The Department of the Interior later interpreted the phrase, “patenting of the 
lands” to include the Secretary of the Interior’s actual approval and the issuing of the 
physical patent, in person, to the intended recipient.18
The citizenship clause in the Dawes Act proved to be the source of much initial 
confusion and increasing trouble on the reservations. “Land grabbers” and “Indian 
skinners” from the nearby white towns were all too anxious to secure control of the 
Indians’ land, and they were quick to take advantage of the uncertainty and confusion
7that ensued following passage of the Dawes Act. More damaging were the large and 
influential land syndicates that emerged specifically to exploit the situation. By the time 
that officials in Washington woke up to the danger and began to direct the agents to 
reassert their authority and crack down on white depredations, the land companies had 
already established powerful claims to the lands. They boldly resisted all efforts of the 
agents to reassert control and prevent Indians and whites from illegally leasing 
reservation land. Ultimately the land companies concocted dubious legal claims based on 
faulty interpretations of Indian citizenship and challenged the agent’s jurisdiction in the 
matter. By calling in social and political favors, the advocates of “free-leasing” on the 
reservations influenced local courts and secured injunctions against the agent, thus 
preventing him from interfering with their lucrative leasing schemes. Never seriously 
expecting to win the final say in court, the land companies did not have to. In the end, 
repeated legal delays would guarantee the objective that they sought.
A study of the Omaha and Winnebago cases indicates how this “silent hand of 
duplicity” worked at the grass roots level, and how this pattern was duplicated on allotted 
reservations throughout the United States between 1887 and 1933. No greater tragedy 
befell Indian people during this era than the “raid on reservations” which collectively cost 
Native Americans over 90,000,000 acres of land by the time that Franklin Roosevelt’s 
New Deal policies finally created a shift in Federal Indian policy.
There is, however, another aspect of Indian-white relations that a case study on 
the problems arising from jurisdictional disputes over leasing on the Omaha and 
Winnebago Reservations serves to illustrate. In his article, “The Civilian as Indian
8Agent: Villain or Victim?,” historian William E. Unrau addressed the stereotypical notion 
of the civilian Indian Agent. As Unrau points out, some vocal opponents of the Indian 
service in the late 19th century overwhelmingly viewed the Indian agent as an 
“unprincipled opportunist who represented everything sinister in the machinations o f the 
hated Indian ring.” According to Unrau, the literature of the day contended that, “no 
public servant was more guilty of subverting the government’s good intentions than the 
lowly Indian agent.” Even Indian Commissioner Thomas J. Morgan lamented in 1891 
that it had become popular to view Indian agents as thieves. Conversely, during this 
same period, an army officer playing the role of Indian agent was viewed as “typically 
honest and efficient as opposed to his stupid and corrupt civilian counterpart in the Indian
> > 1 9service.
Unrau argues that for a number of reasons it is “singularly unfair to cast the 
civilian agent as the principle villain.” Challenging what he calls the “devil theory o f the 
Indian agent,” he points out that the agent was shouldered with awesome responsibilities 
in running the day-to-day operations of his agency, and his position of authority 
inevitably invited unsubstantiated criticisms. For example, the agent’s responsibility for 
issuing and revoking licenses made him susceptible to “easy charges of collusion and 
fraud” by disgruntled businessmen who failed in their bid to become agency traders. The 
agent was also responsible for authenticating the claims of whites who charged Indians 
with destroying or stealing their property and determining compensation to be withheld
• • • 90from future annuities if such claims were found true.
9Although Unrau admits that false or inflated claims were “increasingly popular” 
and that the “rush on the government’s annuity coffers was big business,” he suggests 
that the agents themselves should not suffer entirely the blame. The bureaucratic system 
of Indian administration itself made such fraud “virtually unavoidable,” and the agents 
were almost as much a victim of the system as the Indians themselves. Moreover, similar 
conclusions were reached by many of the interested observers of the day. Civilian Indian 
agents, however, did serve as convenient scapegoats for the shortcomings of the Indian 
Bureau as a whole. Unrau concludes that “sweeping generalizations regarding alleged
conspiracies to defraud both the public and the Indian at the grassroots level have resulted
21in a distorted picture” of the civilian agent.
Although the events in the case study presented here do not involve civilian 
agents, the conclusions reached do lend credence to Unrau’s argument that not all agents 
were as corrupt as usually charged. The relationship between the local civilian 
community and Captain William H. Beck, as acting Indian Agent at the Omaha and 
Winnebago Agency, presents a clear example of the pressures and difficulties an honest 
agent might be pitted against while championing Indian rights against the insatiable 
avarice and greed of unscrupulous whites. Even modem writers who have mentioned 
Beck in passing have found it all too easy to assume that where there is smoke, there is 
fire. It is ironic that the very persistence and unwavering determination that Agent Beck 
demonstrated in his protection of the Indians prompted a mud slinging campaign against 
his character and commitment. The false allegations of corruption were nothing more 
than a last ditch effort by the agent’s adversaries to discredit him in the hopes of having
10
the troublesome agent removed and a new, more pliable agent, appointed in his stead. 
The point is that the allegations, which spread throughout the region by rumor and by the 
yellow press, were, even by the 1890s, all too stereotypical of the behavior that most 
people of the day expected from Indian agents. The case study presented here helps to 
illustrate the fallacy in such assumptions of guilt and begs that other reservation case
studies be attempted to help correct the pitfall of automatically assuming an agent’s guilt
22based on the presence of “smoke” alone.
This thesis has its origins as a shorter paper completed for a graduate seminar in 
Native American History that I had taken from Dr. Michael Tate during the spring of 
2000. At that time I had little idea of how extensive and complex the events of William 
Beck’s struggle against illegal leasing were. As my research progressed, sometimes at a 
snail’s pace and other times by leaps and bounds, the intricate story unfolded. I often 
found myself surprised at how exciting it was to unexpectedly stumble upon material and 
quickly realize that it was a “key” piece of evidence or a missing piece to the puzzle. 
Now, two years later I am pleased to see the project to completion. During that time, 
however, I have incurred a debt of gratitude to persons whom I now take the opportunity 
to thank for their assistance, without which, this project would never have been brought 
to fruition.
First, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Dr. Beth Ritter o f the 
Sociology-Anthropology Department for her kind words of encouragement, guidance and
11
friendship over the past few years. Dr. Jerold Simmons deserves recognition and thanks 
for serving on my thesis committee. Jim Shaw and the staff at the UNO library’s 
government documents section also deserve special thanks for their unwavering patience 
and enthusiasm while cheerfully assisting me in my hunt for documents. I would also 
like to thank Judy Boughter for entrusting me with her copies o f the La Flesche Family 
Papers from the Nebraska State Historical Society archives in Lincoln, Nebraska. In 
addition, I thank her for her work on her own master’s thesis, the bibliography of which I 
often turned to for ideas and guidance on sources. Mary Frances Morrow, archivist at the 
National Archives and Record Administration in Washington, D. C., deserves my 
appreciation for her efforts at responding to what must have seemed like an endless 
stream of e-mail requests for information, and who is responsible for guiding me towards 
the virtual treasure trove of documents that Special Case 191 proved to be.
I would like to recognize the UNO History Department’s Charles and Mary 
Caldwell-Martin Fund and the University of Nebraska at Lincoln’s Center for Great 
Plains Studies for providing generous research grants that made the crucial trip to 
Washington, D. C. possible. In addition, I would also like to extend my appreciation to 
the UNO Graduate Studies Office for awarding me a graduate summer scholarship that 
allowed for some valuable time to focus on writing a large portion o f this thesis.
Dr. Michael Tate, however, as both my graduate and thesis advisor, deserves the 
lion’s share o f my gratitude for his assistance on this project. He not only shared his 
expertise in Native American History, but, more importantly, he extended his patient
12
assistance, skillful editing, helpful suggestions, and kind encouragement over the past 
few years. I thank him for devoting his time to this project.
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CHAPTER ONE
DEBRIS OF THE PAST
“Splendid theories often prove faulty in application and actual practice. It appears to my 
mind that we are trying to erect a new superstructure without removing the debris of the 
past.”
Jesse F. Warner
Omaha and Winnebago Indian Agent
Annual Report, 1889
In his Annual Report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1889, Omaha and 
Winnebago Agent Jesse F. Warner raised several provocative questions about the 
“unresolved problem” associated with Indian citizenship status following allotment of 
reservations. Warner compared the process to “traveling upon an unknown road,” and he 
observed that agency control, while apparently indispensable, simultaneously appeared 
inconsistent with the freedoms implied by citizenship.1 Warner was merely attempting 
to clarify his authority and define the extent of his jurisdiction as agent. He was not 
certain if he still held legitimate authority over Indians who had become citizens, and was 
worried that state authorities might hold him or his Indian police legally accountable for 
interfering with a citizen’s personal rights. More importantly, Warner inquired as to the 
exact meaning of the provision in the Dawes Act itself. The critical part of his inquiry 
focused on the ramifications of the clause calling for a twenty-five year trust period 
through which the federal government retained control of the allotted lands. Specifically, 
he wondered if jurisdiction of the land necessarily extended to include jurisdiction over
16
• • •  • • •  o , . .  # #the civil rights of the individual Indian. Many interested whites claimed that it did not. 
The interpretation of this meaning would prove to be of paramount importance in the 
debate over Indian legal rights to transfer their land titles to non-Indians.
Warner felt that his questions were well justified, especially since he complained 
that the uncertainty of the answers to the Indians’ changed status had confronted him “at 
every turn.” He reported that the State of Nebraska had recently organized the 
reservation into Thurston County and had subsequently begun taxing the personal 
property of Indians just as it did for non-Indian citizens. To make matters worse, whites 
in the area claimed that since Indians were now citizens, the earlier laws relating to them 
and their restrictive intercourse with the whites no longer applied.4 Warner did not 
necessarily agree. He understood the federal government’s position to be that the 
conveyance of citizenship to Indian allottees provided only for state jurisdiction of the 
individual.5 But what was not clear to him was whether federal or state jurisdiction 
prevailed over the Indian who actually resided on the reservation. Warner and others 
complained about the “great disadvantage” that would likely prevail in the local and state 
courts which were notorious for their sympathy towards whites and their disdain for 
Indians. The question of jurisdiction would prove crucial, not only because it 
determined the ultimate authority of the agent and the federal government on the 
reservation, but also because it would address the legality of whites leasing reservation 
lands from Indians.
The practice of leasing reservation land to non-Indians was not new. It had been 
occurring unofficially on several different reservations since 1883 in the form of grazing
17
licenses.6 Although typically referred to as a “lease,” this license to use “surplus grass” 
on reservations differed from a lease in that the license was subject to revocation at any 
time. Although grazing leases with non-Indians did not necessarily lead to conflict on the 
reservations, some serious trouble did occur, particularly with the Cheyennes and 
Arapahoes in Indian Territory. In his report on the event, Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs John D. C. Atkins explained that from the very beginning many members o f the 
two tribes violently opposed the practice. Tensions quickly escalated after a non-Indian 
herder on the reservation killed a Cheyenne named Running Buffalo. The incident served 
to exacerbate the existing animosity between the opposing groups not only within the 
tribes, but also with the white ranchers.7
Tension continued to mount and the civilian agent’s control grew tenuous. With 
rumors of an imminent hostile outbreak among the Cheyennes, the federal government 
finally took active measures to preserve the peace. The War Department immediately 
concentrated all available troops in the region and, on July 10, 1885, dispatched General 
Philip H. Sheridan to investigate the situation.8 On July 23, President Grover Cleveland 
voided all leases, agreements and licenses for grazing purposes made with the Cheyenne 
and Arapaho. In addition, Cleveland ordered the removal of all non-Indians who were 
grazing cattle on the reservation.9 Fortunately, in this particular case, the government 
arranged a peaceful settlement that avoided further hostilities.
Although the Department of the Interior never approved the leases, the Secretary 
admitted to treating them as licenses, and he stated that the arrangements allowed for the 
Indians to revoke them at will.10 On July 21, two days before the president’s
18
proclamation, the United States Attorney General issued his opinion on the subject. 
Citing the Trade and Intercourse Act of June 30, 1834, he held that leasing of Indian 
lands for any purpose was illegal without express consent from the federal government. 
The earlier act considered neither the character under which the Indians held title to their 
land nor the purpose for which they wished to lease it.11 Without a treaty or statutory 
provision amending the 1834 act, the attorney general reasoned that government agents
1 9held no authority to make or approve leases any of reservation land. Despite the clear 
rendering of a decision, white settlers remained drawn to the unique pecuniary 
advantages of dealing with Indians for use of their land. Apparently aware of this 
situation, Atkins called on the Department of the Interior to declare its official policy 
concerning the leasing issue.13 The Department of the Interior accepted the attorney 
general’s ruling.
Although the Office of Indian Affairs forbade leasing on the Cheyenne and 
Arapaho reservations, and on other problematic reservations as well, it allowed the 
remaining reservations, including those of the Omaha and Winnebago, to continue the 
practice.14 The inherent difficulties and major expenses involved with halting leases on 
every reservation where they had already occurred prompted officials not to tamper with 
many of the existing cases. Perpetually understaffed reservation agencies and their 
nominal police forces were woefully inadequate to handle the job. After 1887, the 
agents’ underlying fear that whites involved in leasing were likely to resist their authority 
further compounded these logistical problems. In other cases, agents declined to interfere 
simply because they saw no harm in the leasing process.
19
Leasing their land allowed Indians to derive at least some economic benefit from 
otherwise idle land. Many people saw leasing as mutually beneficial to all parties 
involved, including the Office of Indian Affairs. Consequently, the failure to widely 
enforce the attorney general’s interpretation of the law encouraged Indians and whites 
alike to continue the practice. However, the unofficial and seemingly harmless leasing 
system in place by the mid-1880s was not static. With each passing year, whites became 
increasingly brazen in their dealings with the Indians. The informal leasing system 
quickly degenerated into larger schemes aimed at cheating the Indian and usurping their 
land altogether. By the end of the decade, reports from agents began pouring in to the 
Office of Indian Affairs decrying the Indians’ situation and reporting blatant injustices 
suffered at the hands of unscrupulous whites. Many agents sought governmental sanction 
and regulation for leasing to protect the Indians from further manipulation, while 
allowing them to gain benefit from otherwise unproductive land.15 The reservations of 
the Omaha and Winnebago tribes, where leasing was not officially sanctioned but 
nonetheless tolerated because of an “absence of any complaints,” at least initially, was 
not an exception to the trend.
Leasing, while officially illegal, was not totally opposed, for there were advocates 
o f leasing on a limited scale among both the agents on the reservations and among 
officials in the Indian Office. For example, Agent Warner noted one of the potential 
benefits of leasing to be that money derived from the grazing leases and sale of hay from
1 f\unallotted lands allowed the Omahas to purchase much needed farm machinery. 
Clearly, he reasoned, this was a benefit to the Indians who would otherwise have nothing
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to show for their “surplus grass.” The year before, Commissioner Atkins had made a 
plea to congress, asking it to legislate the leasing issue and indicating that the Indians 
might not be the only ones to benefit. He reminded congress that the more Indians were 
able to provide for themselves, the less the office would require in appropriations to meet 
their needs. He expressed caution, however, and insisted that the leasing take place only
17under proper restrictions.
Others felt that the Indians should be free to lease their lands without restriction. 
Several years later, theologian and advocate of forced acculturation for Indians, Dr. 
Lyman Abbott, reportedly made the comment that there were “ . . . dudes in New York 
who smoke their cigarettes and live on the rents of their property.” The question Dr. 
Abbott posed was why create restrictions against the Indians from doing the same? To 
this, Charles C. Painter, o f the reformist Indian Rights Association, responded derisively, 
“We are not trying to Christianize and civilize the New York dude. Perhaps that would
-I 1 o
be a more difficult thing than we have undertaken.” Painter was generally against the 
policy of leasing allotted lands. He felt it contradicted the original intent o f the Dawes 
Act, which was to civilize the Indian in the classic tradition of the yeoman farmer.
The abuses were not all one-sided, however. Some Indians tried to get away with 
simultaneously leasing their allotment to more than, one person. Oftentimes an Indian 
would secure some goods or small amounts of cash from several different prospective 
lessees in advance. Naturally, each lessee believed that the transaction was a down 
payment or security deposit on the land in question. Inevitably multiple lessees o f the 
same allotment would discover the presence of the other and eventually figure out that
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they had been deceived by the same Indian. No doubt, some Indians arranged multiple 
leases out of complete ignorance of the fundamentals involved in the system. Others, 
however, understood the system all too well and used it to take advantage of 
unsuspecting whites.19
Both situations were common among the Omahas who had been practicing 
leasing from an earlier date than the Winnebagoes. The Omaha reservation was first 
allotted in 1882, five years before the Dawes Act offered land in severalty to the rest of 
the country’s Indians. The Act of August 7, 1882, placed the Omahas under the laws of 
the State of Nebraska, both civil and criminal, but did not make them citizens of the 
United States. The 1882 act did specifically state, however, that the Omahas’ land was 
not taxable during the requisite twenty-five year trust period, nor could tribal members 
sell or encumber it in any way.20 Apparently, whites did not interpret this clause to 
include an express prohibition against leasing Indian land under government trust. 
Whites interpreted the phrase “sole use and benefit of the Indian” to mean sole use or 
benefit. The Indians received compensation for the land leased, and since they derived 
benefit from it, no law was broken.
The leasing problems were becoming more acute each year as the rapacity of non- 
Indians for reservation land increased just as the availability of land outside the Thurston 
County reservations decreased. Following the passage of the Dawes Act in 1887, 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs John D. C. Atkins detailed Special Agent Alice C. 
Fletcher to conduct the allotment of the Winnebagos.21 In the spring of 1888, having 
completed only about 400 allotments, Fletcher returned to Washington. When she came
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back to the reservation at the end of August, she found that during that summer cattlemen
99had “overrun the reservation.”
In 1887, Atkins reported his disappointment that Congress had still not addressed 
the issue and he again requested that it legislate on the matter. The following year, 
Commissioner John H. Oberly expressed his concern that the leases still did not have 
legal standing. Since the leases closely affected the Indians’ welfare, and at the same 
time involved large property interests, he felt that the issue warranted prompt 
consideration by Congress. The Commissioner lamented the confusing situation since the 
Department could not approve of the leases, and thereby gain from them, without a law 
officially authorizing them to do so. 24
Even had Congress acted more quickly in passing legislation to either endorse or 
prohibit leasing, it would not have likely settled the issue. To some, the severalty law 
and the conveyance of citizenship to the Indians on the Omaha and Winnebago 
reservations indicated an apparent severance of their tribal relationship with the federal 
government. Some members of Congress argued that as citizens, Indians could no longer 
claim tribal status. Many whites, including those in state governments, assumed that this 
meant that the federal government could no longer exercise legal jurisdiction over 
allotted Indians. This assumption added a whole new level of confusion to the leasing 
controversy. After allotment, the central issue to some was no longer whether Congress 
allowed, restricted, or prohibited the leasing of Indian lands, but rather how quickly could 
the federal protective authority be abrogated.
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A more legally complex issue questioned whether Congress still had the right to 
interfere in the matter at all, and the conflict evolved into a larger dispute between 
competing federal and state jurisdictions. Many advocates argued that congressional 
legislation restricting or prohibiting leasing of Indian lands only applied to non-citizen 
Indians, not to Indians who had been allotted and therefore declared citizens. Although 
the Dawes Act clearly expressed that the federal government held allotted land in trust for 
the “sole use and benefit of the Indians,” proponents of leasing did not interpret this to 
prohibit leasing. Through leasing, they reasoned, the Indian was ostensibly earning a 
rent from the lessee, and therefore gaining a “benefit.” But some Indian Service 
employees began to question this assertion about Native American benefits.
By September 1889, Agent Jesse Warner’s original enthusiasm for the benefits of 
leasing unused grazing land to non-Indians had soured. Warner described a typical 
scenario that he increasingly had to deal with from non-Indian ranchers on the 
reservation. While the Indian Office had previously tolerated leasing on the reservation 
because of a “lack of any complaints,” the once congenial arrangements had become 
decidedly problematic. Although the Indian Office instructed the agent to drive off any 
trespassing cattle and herders on the reservation, Warner responded that such an 
apparently simple remedy was no longer feasible. White men owned the land 
surrounding the reservation, “ . . . and to ‘drive o ff  is to drive into some man’s farm and
9 ^be liable for all damages and vexatious lawsuits.”
The most common problem concerned habitual offenders. Warner’s Indian police 
force, heretofore-utilized primary as truancy officers and to intercept whiskey peddlers
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and timber thieves, consisted of only one captain and several privates. The existing 
police force was not, in Warner’s opinion, capable of handling the myriad of white “land 
pirates.” Perhaps this last problem explains why Warner did not have his Indian police 
simply confiscate the trespassing cattle and levy fines on the owners when they came to 
collect their property. It was likely that a myriad of vexatious lawsuits, coupled with the 
disadvantageous position of the Indian in unsympathetic local and state courts, would 
render any action taken by the agent ineffectual. Laws defining punishment for 
depredations on reservation land existed, but since the process was lengthy and only the
onU.S. Department of Justice could initiate a case, these laws were rarely enforced. Even 
with successful prosecution, Warner noted that the herders were so “impecunious” that
'J O
the judgment awarded was “ . . . not worth the paper upon which it was written.” 
Forced to witness the injustice for a number of years, Warner became convinced that new
OQlegislation was essential in order to prevent white transgressions on Indian land.
In the autumn of 1889, Robert H. Ashley replaced Jesse Warner as agent at the 
Omaha and Winnebago Agency. By this time many of the white lessees had actually 
taken up residence on the rented land and were becoming “more and more aggressive and 
independent.”30 Like Warner, Ashley was convinced that Congress could resolve most of 
the immediate problems by endorsing leasing on a restricted basis and under agency
T 1supervision. However, Ashley subscribed to the view held by Charles Painter and 
many others that upheld Henry Dawes’ original intent of the allotment process to act as a 
catalyst for “civilizing” the Indian. In this regard, Ashley deviated from his 
predecessor’s endorsement of leasing by suggesting that only in certain qualified cases,
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such as due to age or disability, should the government allow Indians to lease their 
allotments in order to support themselves.
Congress finally showed some interest in the matter on January 13, 1891, when 
the United States Senate passed a resolution calling upon the Department of the Interior 
to report on the current state of the leasing controversy. Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs Thomas J. Morgan received a full report from Agent Ashley within weeks. 
Ashley stated that the Winnebagos had not only been leasing their allotted lands to white 
people, but more alarmingly, that they had also surrendered “entire control” of the land to 
them as well. The Indians simply ignored the agent’s repeated warnings that they had no 
legal right to lease their allotments. The immediate problem was not, however, the 
existence of an unofficial system of leasing operating against federal law, but rather the 
damage that it was causing to Indian families.34
Up until 1890, whites commonly arranged leases only for one year at a time and 
strictly for grazing purposes. Not only had the number of leases increased every year, but 
some of them even provided for an extended lease period covering multiple years. 
Another alarming development was that white lessees had begun to break the ground for 
farming and had even built their homes on the land. As of January 23, 1891, John F. 
Myers, the Thurston County Clerk, reported that Winnebago land leased to white settlers
o  c
and recorded at the county offices totaled 22,134 acres. Ashley’s explicit warnings to 
settlers that the leases were invalid despite the fact they had been recorded in the county
q / '
clerk’s office had little effect. Confident whites simply ignored Ashley just as had the
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Indians. Abuse of the existing system to gain unfair advantage over Indians had become 
standard practice among many whites.
Several land syndicates, including B. T. Hull & Sons, Wheeler and Chittenden 
and E. J. Smith, arose at this time specifically to exploit the situation. By far the largest 
company operating on the Omaha and Winnebago Reservations was the Flournoy 
Livestock and Real Estate Company, which controlled at least 37,000 acres of 
Winnebago land by 1895. Three principal partners controlled the Flournoy Company. 
John S. Lemon, the company’s president, was married to a Winnebago Indian woman 
named Henrietta. John F. Myers served as Treasurer o f the Flournoy Company while 
simultaneously holding office as Thurston County Clerk. The third partner, Arthur W. 
Turner, served as Secretary. Although lessor investors held some shares, the main 
capitalist and acting manager was John F. Myers, who invested about $4,000 into the 
venture.37
The Flournoy Company convinced prospective lessees and the Indians themselves 
that the agent no longer held any legitimate authority over them. The Company then 
leased land directly from allotted Indians at an incredibly low average rate of sixteen and 
one half cents per acre. This same land was then sub-leased through the Company to
- l o
white settlers for as much as two dollars and twenty-five cents per acre. Serving in his 
official capacity as county clerk, Myers dutifully recorded all o f the leasing transactions 
at the county offices in Pender, Nebraska.
The conflict of interests between white land grabbers and the agent had its roots in 
the brief period following the allotment process when the Dawes Act’s provision for
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Indian citizenship was not yet fully understood. The same phrasing in Section Six that 
land syndicates pointed to when claiming that the agent had no authority also caused the 
agent to have doubts. Like his predecessor, Ashley was unsure of his own authority in 
the matter and he requested clarification from the Commissioner. Specifically he wanted 
to know how far his authority extended in matters that involved Indians who had been 
made citizens.39
Occasionally the Department o f the Interior sent inspectors to investigate the 
conditions on Indian reservations. In the summer of 1890, Inspector William W. Junkin 
visited the Omaha and Winnebago reservations. In one of his reports, Junkin found 
“ . . . considerable confusion and dissatisfaction over the questions o f grazing and 
allotments . . . He traced the problems to the question of whether or not the Indians 
had the right to lease the lands in the first place. Junkin was certain that they did not. 
Furthermore, Junkin believed that leasing caused more harm than good, since, in his 
view, it promoted degenerative behavior instead of promoting the perceived civilizing 
effect of owning and working the land.40 Clearly, Junkin was in the camp of those who 
felt that allowing Indians to lease their land would be to promote an Indian version of the 
undesirable “New York dude.”
Junkin was concerned that it was common among white men to lease grazing land 
from the Indians at only ten cents per acre. Considering that the market value for land of 
similar quality was five to ten dollars per acre, Junkin thought this amount absurdly 
low.41 Not only were the rents pitiM ly inadequate, but white men’s cattle were 
damaging crops and haylands of the few industrious Indians who were struggling to
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“walk the white man’s road.” 42 The Inspector readily observed that “the result of this 
leasing business is that the Indians receive a small compensation for this land and lie idle 
about all the time, eking out a miserable existence.” Whites were taking advantage of the 
Indians and in the process retarding their “progress toward civilization.”43 Junkin 
implored the Secretary of the Interior to take steps to put an end to the “white menace” on 
the reservations.44 He thought that it would be more beneficial for the Indians to farm 
their own lands and graze their own cattle, but if  leasing was to be allowed, it should be 
done under regulation of the Interior Department and through the agent.
A subsequent report by another inspector, Arthur M. Tinker, indicated that white 
transgressions against the welfare o f the Indians continued largely unabated, despite the 
agent’s constant efforts.45 Tinker’s conclusion about the trouble between non-Indians and 
Indians on the reservation was similar to Junkin’s. The former suggested that if leasing 
was to be tolerated, then a responsible person acting in the best interest of the Indians 
should be empowered to make and enforce the leases. The Inspector felt that caution was 
necessary not only to protect the Indian from unscrupulous whites, but also to preserve 
the original intent of the Dawes Act in promoting the transformation of Indians into 
industrious citizens. Like Ashley, Tinker favored legislation that restricted leasing only 
to Indians who were unable to work the land themselves.46
Congress finally passed legislation providing a means to that end on February 28,
1891. The act allowed leasing of reservation land when, “ . . .  by reason of age or other 
disability . . . ” the allottee could not “ . . . personally and with benefit to himself occupy 
or improve his allotment . . . .”47 It specified that leases made under such circumstances
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would be allowed “ . . . upon such terms and conditions as the agent in charge of such 
reservation may recommend, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.”
Although the law was official, Ashley had not yet received the rules and 
regulations of the Department instructing him on the procedures to award leases. He 
earnestly requested “ . . . that this subject be given early attention . . .  as year by year it 
becomes more and more complicated.”49 In the meantime, deals involving leases 
negotiated directly between whites and Indians continued unabated. On February 15, 
1892, almost a year after Congress authorized leasing for this specific category of 
allottee, the Department of the Interior finally directed Ashley to take charge of the 
leasing process under the earlier provisions of the law.50 Although Congress had finally 
authorized leasing of reservation lands on a limited basis, non-Indians continued to work 
outside the system to their best advantage. This was not surprising given the new 
restrictions.
While making the decision to re-lease through the agency or to stand behind a 
current, illegal lease, the individual faced a number of influencing factors. Leasing 
through the agency was less advantageous and more restrictive than dealing directly with 
the Indians. The agency-supervised leasing system was specifically designed to protect 
the Indians from being taken advantage of by unscrupulous whites and to prevent capable 
Indians from leasing their land instead of working it themselves. The new more rigid and 
demanding requirements and restrictions of the Department replaced the more flexible 
and generous terms that favored the lessee under the old system.
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The most obvious drawback confronting direct-from-Indian lessees under the new 
system was that the agent negotiated higher rates for the Indians’ benefit. He had to 
physically inspect the land of the proposed lease and issue a sworn statement that the 
proposed rent was reasonable. Earlier it had been possible to lease good land for as little 
as ten to twenty cents an acre directly from Indians. With the agent enforcing “fair 
market” minimum pricing, the cost averaged about one dollar and twenty-five cents an 
acre, and oftentimes reached an even higher sum. The majority of actual settlers obtained 
a sublease through a second party, usually one of the big land companies, but 
occasionally from individual speculators as well. The land companies acted as 
middlemen, acquiring large tracts of land from the Indians at low rates and sub-leasing to 
whites at substantially higher rates. Consequently, large land companies such as the 
Flournoy Company acquired huge profits while the Indians lost control of their land and 
received few financial benefits.
Although for most settlers the cost of the sublease through a land syndicate or 
speculator was comparable to the costs through the agency, other considerations deterred 
them from leasing through the agency. There was the matter of financing the lease. 
Whether the settler dealt directly with an Indian or more commonly obtained his land 
through a sublease from a land syndicate such as Flournoy Company, his immediate 
financial burden was relatively light. Settlers who leased directly often paid paltry sums 
to secure the lease and then made either sporadic payments or no payments at all. Some 
whites, for example, paid their rents “in orders on stores, broken-down horses, groceries,
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[or] a few dollars in money at a time . . ..”51 One settler, Nicholas Fritz, allegedly used 
6,500 acres of Indian land over a period of five years and paid nothing for it.
Those who subleased from land syndicates often signed promissory notes that 
allowed them to delay payment of some or all the rent until after they sold their future 
harvest, at which time they would make good on their note. Many settlers who leased 
land under the unregulated system did not qualify to carry a lease under the new agency 
system. Government regulations required the agent to collect cash payment in advance 
for the first six months of the lease, and the balance in bond at full value of the remaining 
rental. Most farmers did not have enough cash to meet this requirement.53
This was especially true among settlers who faced the real possibility of having to 
pay dual rents on the same lease. This predicament occurred when land syndicates sold 
to local or regional banks the promissory notes that were given to them by the settler. 
The profit margins on brokered Indian leases were so high that speculators reaped huge 
returns on their investments despite the discount given to banks on the notes that they 
sold. Speculators pocketed cash and the banks now owned the settlers’ notes. 
Subsequently told that their existing leases were “null and void” and that they would have 
to re-lease through the agency with six months cash up front, spelled financial disaster for 
the settler. Under these conditions, it is understandable why so many settlers resisted the 
agent’s efforts to stop illegal leasing.54
While the total cost of a lease through the agency was usually not greater than the 
cost through a land syndicate, the new regulations of the agency system disqualified 
many applicants from consideration for non-pecuniary reasons. In some cases, all or part
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of the land currently occupied by a settler did not meet the criteria for leasing under the 
regulations set out by the Department. If those particular settlers wished to remain on the 
reservation, they would have to move to another part of it. Understandably, this was 
unacceptable to settlers who in previous years had built their homes and spent time 
breaking, tilling and fencing fields.
Besides the prohibitive initial cash outlay, the agent was also required to attest to 
the “ . . . character, uprightness, and intelligence of the proposed lessee . . . ” and to use 
his judgment to decide if the “ . . . presence of said lessee will be beneficial to the 
Indians.”55 If the lessee’s potential to set a “good example” for the Indians was not 
considered likely, the agent was to deny the lease. The office did not provide the agent 
with specific criteria for determining who represented a “good example.” In this sense, 
the Office of Indian Affairs vested discretionary power solely in the agent’s judgment.
By early 1892, the period of unregulated leasing on the Omaha and Winnebago 
Reservations was over. Congress had authorized leasing of unallotted tribal lands, as 
well as individual allotments under restrictive circumstances. The additional work and 
responsibility for overseeing the new agency leasing system was unceremoniously thrust 
upon the agent.56 From then on he was responsible for arranging the leases and enforcing 
the rules of the Department o f the Interior. In theory, the problems stemming from 
unregulated and illegal leasing would disappear. In their place, the new agency system 
would simultaneously protect the Indians’ best interests and allow for leasing on a limited 
basis for those who needed it most. In reality, the new system was set in place before the 
old system had been forced to release its grip. Officials in Washington did not anticipate
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the strong reaction of local vested interests who had found lucrative investments within 
the earlier, unregulated system. Consequently, the new agency leasing system 
immediately ran into problems with which it was unprepared to deal.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE LEASING LAND GRAB
“One vexed question the Indians want settled is, whether they have a right to lease their 
houses and allotted land, also the unallotted land of the reservation for a term of years to 
white men, without consulting the Agent or anyone.”1
Arthur M. Tinker 
Indian Inspector 
October 22, 1890
The Act of February 28, 1891, which amended the General Allotment Act of 
1887, authorized leasing of tribal lands on authority o f a council speaking on behalf of 
the entire tribe. It also allowed the leasing of allotted lands, but only if  the allottee met 
certain qualifying restrictions. In the spring of 1892, the Commissioner o f Indian Affairs 
instructed Agent Robert Ashley to present the leasing question directly to the Indians. 
The elected council of the Omahas approved the idea and authorized the agent to lease 
tribal lands at one-year periods for no less than twenty-five cents an acre. The Omahas 
requested that the agent, so far as possible, lease to members o f the Omaha tribe first, 
before considering applications from white men. After approval by the agent, the 
Secretary of the Interior required that all prospective leases be forwarded to the 
Department for final approval. All leases were to be prepaid and bonded. Ashley 
reported that most unallotted Omaha land had already been leased under “favorable 
terms,” and that the remaining unallotted land should go quickly. The agent estimated 
that the combined rent for all Omaha land for the 1892 season should be more than 
$12,000.2
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Ashley addressed the issue of leasing to the Winnebagos in a similar manner. The 
Winnebagos proceeded to elect a council specifically to transact all business related to 
leasing tribal land. Like the Omahas, the Winnebagos also requested that the agent give 
preference to members of the tribe in granting leases. Under the new arrangements, 
Ashley expected the Winnebagos to receive double the income in 1892 that they had 
received in 1891. This estimate, however, did not take into consideration prior claims to 
tribal lands by previous illegal lessees.
Many Omahas were still interested in leasing their individual allotments even 
though they were not authorized under the new restrictions. Ashley likewise received 
many letters from interested white men who were inquiring about leasing. The agent 
expressly stated to both Indians and whites that the Omahas did not have the right to lease 
any allotted lands except in special cases with the agent’s permission. Nevertheless, the 
temptation among white men and Indians alike was too strong, and unauthorized leasing 
directly between whites and Indians occurred behind the agent’s back. In August, 
Inspector William W. Junkin reported to the Secretary of the Interior that there were 
“innumerable” leases established by Omaha and Winnebago Indians with white men but 
without approval from the agent. Junkin pointed out that the white men usually cheated 
the Indians in the transactions and he remarked that the leases were on file at the 
Thurston County Recorder’s Office in Pender.4
On April 28, 1891, a group of four Winnebago Indians — Thomas Decora, 
Alexander Payer, Joseph A. Lamere and Alex St. Cyr -  acting without authority from the 
tribe, represented themselves as the official Winnebago council and proceeded to sign a
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lease agreement with a white man named Nick Fritz. The lease granted use of certain 
unallotted lands to Fritz for grazing purposes only in consideration for an annual rent of 
$522. If the government subsequently deemed it necessary to allot any of the land 
included in his lease, the agreement stipulated the deduction of fifteen cents for each acre 
removed from the lease from the final rent. Guy T. Graves, the Thurston County 
Attorney, witnessed the signing of the lease.5 The language of the document implied 
that the lease was renewable each year. Although Fritz had submitted his lease to Ashley 
for approval, the agent did not act on it at the time because he had not yet received any 
explicit instructions from the Department authorizing him to do so. This did not deter 
Fritz who, within the year, proceeded to invest $2,500 for fencing the land. Following 
the expiration of the first lease, an officially recognized council of Winnebagos 
authorized the lease of the same land encompassed by Fritz’s lease to another tenant.6
Ashley suspected that Fritz would probably “throw the case into court, or get 
action delayed,” and either way the tribe would lose revenue.7 Ashley’s prediction was 
not far off. Within the week, Fritz had secured the services of H. C. Brome, a lawyer 
from Omaha. Brome wrote a letter to Commissioner Thomas J. Morgan in which he 
explained that his client held a legitimate lease to the land signed by members of a 
council of Winnebago Indians in April 1891. Although it was true that Fritz had 
presented the lease to Ashley for approval, the agent had never acted on it, stating he had 
no authority to do so. Brome insisted that the Act of February 28, 1891 authorized such 
leases and that the lease was legal. Although Fritz claimed to have acted in good faith, he
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was aware that a second Winnebago Council had later leased the same land to another 
tenant.8
Fritz planned to prevent the execution of any new leases made for the same land 
by tying up the issue in the local courts and within the Department o f the Interior. Agent 
Ashley considered Fritz to be nothing more than a troublemaker and he claimed that Fritz 
had actually been using the 6,000 acres of Winnebago tribal land during the previous four 
years without paying the tribe anything for it. Despite his best efforts over the previous 
two years, Ashley had not been able to recover even one penny of the thousands of 
dollars that Fritz rightfully owed the Winnebago tribe. Fritz relied on his original, though 
entirely fraudulent, lease to delay matters and thus prevent action by throwing the matter 
into the local courts. The tactics that Fritz used to delay action in his case provides an 
early example o f what would become common practice among the illegal lessees.9
On the day after Fritz received his lease, the same four Winnebagos returned to 
Pender where they illegally leased 1,556.81 acres o f land for five years to the Flournoy 
Company for $233.52, or fifteen cents an acre. John Myers, the Thurston County Clerk, 
witnessed the transaction. While acting in capacity o f his job as county clerk, he was at 
the same time acting treasurer of Flournoy Company to whom the lease was being made. 
Later that year, two of the Winnebagos, Lamere and Payer, leased an additional 320 acres 
to the Flournoy Company through John S. Lemmon, the company’s president, and the 
transaction was again witnessed by Myers.
Ashley reported the illegal leasing and requested instructions on how to proceed. 
The Acting Secretary of the Department of the Interior responded that the agent was
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authorized to lease unallotted land on the Winnebago Reservation only if the minimum 
rent o f twenty-five cents an acre could be obtained. If so, the Secretary agreed to approve 
one-year leases beginning May 1, 1893.10 The issue of leasing unallotted Omaha tribal 
lands, however, fell under a separate set of circumstances, and the Acting Secretary 
recommended that the leasing of unallotted Omaha land be temporarily suspended 
pending possible amendment to the Act of August 7, 1882.11
The Indian Appropriations Act for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1894, the 
Acting Secretary explained, contained proposed legislation which, if  passed, would 
double the amount of land allotted to the Omahas from one-sixteenth section (40 acres) to 
one-eighth section (80 acres). If  the act passed Congress, it would still need to meet with 
the approval of the Omaha tribe before the Secretary of the Interior could officially 
authorize allotments. If  this occurred, large amounts of tribally held land would suddenly 
be needed not only to provide new allotments, but also to increase the amount of land 
held by existing allottees. The amount of tribal land available for leasing would be 
reduced proportionately. The Acting Secretary pointed out that under the circumstances
it would be prudent to wait until Congress decided the outcome of the pending legislation
1 0so that land possibly needed for allotments would not be leased prematurely.
The Act of February 28, 1891, authorized the leasing of unallotted tribal lands 
only as long as the Indians, in council, gave their consent. The Winnebagos granted 
Ashley permission to lease unallotted land in 1892, but with the stipulation that he give 
preference to members of the tribe before leasing to white men. The Winnebagos agreed 
to lease the tribes’ unallotted lands for one year on the best terms they could get. On
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March 28, Ashley advertised for informal proposals to lease, but by April 10, he had only 
received one proposal for “a very small part” o f the total. As it happened, very few 
potential lessees expressed an interest in any of the 7,000 acres of unallotted reservation 
land. This was largely because a group of Winnebago Indians had already leased the 
tribal land to the Flournoy Company without the agent’s knowledge. Through this illegal 
lease, the Company had already claimed most of the land that Ashley now offered to 
lease in 1892. Apparently, most prospective lessees were not willing to contest the land 
syndicate’s claim to the land.13
At least one interested party, however, showed some interest. John Lemmon’s 
wife, Henrietta, a Winnebago Indian, procured a one-year lease with Ashley on June 2, 
1892, for 6,720.32 acres of unallotted tribal land. Of course, the real impetus behind the 
lease was John Lemmon, who was president of the Flournoy Company.14 He likely saw a 
unique opportunity to get “legally” what he had already acquired in practical terms, 
“illegally.” He used his wife’s status as a Winnebago to take advantage o f the tribe’s 
clause requiring the agent to lease to tribal members before whites, many of whom were 
held at bay by the Flournoy Company’s claim to the land.
After Ashley had already drawn up the original lease, John Lemmon discovered 
that the Omahas had recently granted a five-year lease on a large tract o f tribal pasture to 
Rosalie Farley. Rosalie was an Omaha married to a white man. Rosalie’s husband, 
Edward Farley, acted as his wife’s business agent. Since competition for acquiring land 
was increasing, Lemmon wanted to secure his land for five years as well. Accordingly, 
Henrietta contacted Ashley and expressed her interest in extending the lease period to
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five years instead of one. Ashley, in turn, consulted with the Winnebago council on her 
request, but the council decided unanimously to keep the lease for one year only. It is 
possible that Ashley forwarded the lease to Washington on the original terms o f a one- 
year lease without informing Henrietta that the council had denied her request for the 
extension. When the Secretary of the Interior approved it on September 10, 1892, the 
lease provided only a one-year term.15
When Ashley first notified Henrietta that the lease was available, she originally 
told him she would come to the agency with the payment to pick it up. However, days 
went by and she failed to show. When Ashley reminded her later that the first payment 
was due before she could receive the lease, Henrietta blamed the delay on her own 
difficulty in receiving payment from one of her own sub-lessees, Nick Fritz. More time 
passed and Ashley came to the conclusion that Henrietta was not going to honor the 
lease. The Department directed Ashley to pursue legal action against Henrietta in local 
court to enforce the terms of the lease.16
It is likely that upon receiving the news that the agency lease only provided for a 
one-year period, John Lemmon decided that he would be better off holding the illegal 
five-year lease direct from the Indian “council.” The land covered in Henrietta’s one- 
year agency lease was nearly identical to the land that her husband, through the Flournoy 
Company, had leased earlier through the “council.” Apparently John decided that if  the 
terms were still favorable, it might be worthwhile to legitimize his claim to the land by 
securing an agency-endorsed lease. Not until after he found out that the Winnebagos 
would only lease the land at one-year intervals, did he change his mind. Since reverting
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to the old lease gave him claim to the land for five years, he must have decided that it was 
worth taking a risk and standing behind the old lease. By insisting the old lease was 
valid, Lemmon maintained control of the land. In the meanwhile, he needed to figure out 
how to void Henrietta’s contractual obligation under the new lease.
On October 13, 1892, John Lemmon responded to Ashley’s repeated requests for 
payment in an angry letter on Flournoy Company letterhead. Lemmon indicated that 
Henrietta refused to honor the lease because she claimed that the terms of the lease as 
approved were “wrong.” John complained that Ashley had excluded some of the very 
land that he and his wife had hoped to secure through the lease. Furthermore, the lease 
was only good for one year, not the five years that they had sought.17 In response, 
Ashley pointed out that the land described in the lease had not changed at all. If  it did not 
include the land that Henrietta had wanted, he wondered why she had signed the lease. 
Ashley also pointed out that the original lease specified a one-year period, not five, and 
although he admitted Henrietta had requested that it be extended, the tribe had declined to 
do so.18 Nevertheless, John had found his excuse and was sticking to his story. As far as 
he was concerned, Henrietta’s lease was invalid and he refused to be restrained by it.
The Flournoy Company claimed possession of all the land covered by Henrietta’s 
lease under the five-year extension provision of an earlier unauthorized lease in 1891. 
The rental agreed to in this older, though unauthorized, lease was considerably less than 
the terms of the recent lease approved by Agent Ashley and the Secretary of the Interior. 
The Flournoy Company and its sub-lessees had since fenced a great majority o f the land 
in question. White settlers sub-leased the land from the Flournoy Company for five year
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periods, and were paying on average one dollar an acre for land and breaking it for 
agricultural purposes.
Ashley reported that the refusal of the Lemmons to make good on the lease and 
their violation of the provisions of the 1891 act by sub-leasing and using land for 
agricultural purposes were indicative of their lack of respect for the authority o f the 
Interior Department over the Indian lands.19 In addition to disputing possession of the 
land in local courts, the Flournoy Company used threats and intimidation to prevent any 
potential lessees from making proposals directly to Ashley to rent the unallotted land. 
Strictly denying the authority of the agent in all leasing matters, the Flournoy Company 
dealt directly with the Winnebago s. By inducing the Indians to take small amounts of 
money, the Flournoy Company hoped to justify its claim of possession under the 1891 
lease.20
When the Department of the Interior received word of Henrietta Lemmon’s 
refusal to honor the lease agreement, it directed the matter to the U.S. Attorney General 
and requested that steps be taken to bring suit against her and two others who failed to 
make payments on their leases. On November 8, 1892, the attorney general directed the 
District Attorney for Nebraska to file suit against Henrietta Lemmon as the principal, and 
Dwight M. Wheeler and Nick Fritz as sureties on Lemmon’s bond, for rent due under the
9 1agreement with Ashley and as approved by the Department of the Interior.
By the end of April 1893, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs was pressing Agent 
Ashley for information regarding the case. Ashley replied that although he had written 
District Attorney Benjamin S. Baker numerous times during the previous months, he was
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unable to get the information requested by the Commissioner. Ashley stated that what 
little information he did have was from outside sources. In November o f the previous 
year, Ashley had sent a letter to Baker in which he offered to provide any information 
necessary to help the case. Ashley even offered to travel to Omaha to meet with him, if 
necessary. The district attorney, however, never responded to Ashley’s letters.
Still pressed for information, Ashley decided to travel to Omaha to find out first 
hand what was going on with the case. Baker had filed the petition on December 7, 1892, 
and the defendants filed their answers on January 5. While in Omaha, Ashley sought out 
the district attorney who informed Ashley that the case was awaiting trial during the May 
term, but he doubted whether it would be heard during that time. He did not elaborate on 
the reasons for the expected delay.
The May term came and went, but the case was not heard. On July 11, 1893, 
Baker wrote a letter to the Attorney General of the United States in which he explained 
that the hearing of the case o f United States vs. Henrietta Lemmon, et. al. had been 
delayed. Although Baker stated that he protested the action, the court granted the 
defendants a continuance because their “key witness” was severely ill.24
The defendants in the case of United States vs. Henrietta Lemmon, et. al. shared 
the same lawyer, H.C. Brome. Henrietta, however, filed a separate answer in which she 
flatly denied that she had ever made an agreement with Ashley to lease land for a period 
of one year beginning on May 1, 1892, as the complainant charged. She stated that the 
agreement she signed in the presence of Ashley on April 30, 1892 at the agency was for a 
period of no less than five years, and she alleged that i f  the lease she signed on that date
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stated the lease was for less than five years, then it must have been “unlawfully and 
fraudulently” altered or otherwise changed in the respect to length of the lease. 
Alternatively, she surmised that Ashley had substituted a different lease at the time of her 
signing than the one she agreed to sign, and indeed thought she was signing. Her answer 
further stated that at the time of the lease, Ashley explained to her that the lease would 
not become official until the Secretary of the Interior approved and returned it to the 
agency and the agent, in turn, supplied her with a final copy of the documents. She 
alleged that Ashley had never delivered the lease to her nor had she ever taken possession 
of the land covered by the lease. According to her, the lease was never finalized. 
Perhaps most interesting of all, she claimed, that the United States, as complainant, did 
not have the right to collect rental money in the first place because it was not the “real
• • 9 S •party of interest in this action” over the land. The tenuous constructions and 
interpretive technicalities heavily relied upon by Brome in his pseudo-legal defense of 
Henrietta Lemmon in her case against the United States were indicative of what was to 
come.
By the early 1890’s, there was no shortage of white men in northeastern Nebraska 
who did not covet the rich agricultural and grazing lands which appeared to them as 
“going to waste” within the boundaries of the Omaha and Winnebago Reservations. For 
their part, there were many Indians on the reservation who were just as eager to lease the 
land as there were whites willing to do so. Whites offering even the smallest down 
payments in money or goods found no dearth of desperate Indians willing to sign over the 
use of their land for a pittance. Despite the congressional legislation official authorizing
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leasing under on a limited scale and under certain restrictions, the Indian Office was slow 
to provide guidelines to its agents in the field. Ashley’s resultant hesitation to act on the 
leases only served to alienate the more impatient among both the whites and the Indians 
eager to make leases immediately. Consequently, by the time the agent was in the 
position to officiate over the leasing process, a great portion of the land on the 
reservations was already held under illegal leases.
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CHAPTER THREE
A CURIOUS CONDITION OF AFFAIRS
“A prerequisite o f citizenship upon the part o f the Indian is that he should be an allottee 
of lands. Citizenship confers, as is contended, upon the Indian all the rights, privileges 
and immunities that it confers upon the white citizen, and that therefore in order to most 
effectually [sic] rob the Indian he must first be elevated to the rank o f a citizen; this 
accomplished he is the oyster of the white man, and without the protection o f the 
Government from the rapacity and frauds of the crafty whites who are only too anxious to 
speedily possess themselves of all the substance of the Indians.”1
Andrew J. Sawyer
District Attorney for the State o f Nebraska
August 1, 1895
In late June 1893, newly-appointed Indian Agent William H. Beck arrived in 
Pender amid great fanfare. Members of the Pender Ring, anxious to get on his good side, 
gathered to welcome the agent personally and later they held a banquet in his honor at the 
Grand Peebles Hotel.2 Little did the Penderites know that over the next few years Beck 
would prove to be their most ardent opponent as he worked tirelessly to end their 
exploitation of the Indians under his care.
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Daniel M. Browning had forewarned Beck about 
what he could expect to face as agent for the Omahas and Winnebagos. Certainly the 
most difficult matter facing Beck involved the continued unauthorized leasing of Indian 
land. Browning was convinced that the leasing, which he admitted had been “in vogue” 
for several years on the reservations, had been “greatly detrimental” to the Indians’ best 
interests and those of the Department of the Interior. Accordingly, the Commissioner 
wanted Beck to finally “crush out and destroy” the illegal leasing before it destroyed the
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effectiveness of agency supervision. Upon assuming control of the agency from Ashley, 
Beck began to assess the condition of affairs on the reservations for himself. He did not 
like what he found.
By the end of July, Beck had come to terms with what he felt was a vastly 
disorganized mess. The problems stemming from indiscriminate leasing practices on the 
reservations were even more perplexing than Browning had indicated. Although the 
Winnebagos were generally in favor of allotments, Beck reported to the Commissioner 
that their understanding of the responsibilities that went along with owning private land 
was “limited.”4 He confirmed that many of the Winnebagos had made illegal leases 
with whites for unreasonably low rates. In addition, Indians who had leased their land 
were not progressing towards “civilization,” but had resorted to idleness, poverty, and 
despair.5 Beck also reported that the situation with the Omahas was even worse. Many 
of the Omahas had leased their allotments to whites as well, and had even allowed the
/  A
whites to take possession of the Indians’ government-built houses. Equally alarming, 
the Omahas were indifferent to the agent’s authority, and they openly ignored the 
regulations of the Department concerning leasing procedures. Beck suspected that the 
previous agent had not done much, if anything, to enforce the rules or assert his 
authority.7
Beck began to identify the problems and he took immediate steps to correct them.
*
The agent found that numerous problematic circumstances arose from complications 
involving illegal leasing. Most alarming among the immediate problems were incidents 
o f Indians leasing land that did not belong to them in the first place. In some cases, an
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Indian claiming to be a minor’s legal guardian had leased the minor’s allotment to whites. 
The self-appointed guardian then kept the proceeds from the lease. Minors who 
subsequently came of age and sought to assume control of their allotments found their 
land already leased, unbeknownst to them. Other problems arose from Indian husbands 
retaining control of their ex-wives’ land even after the couple had divorced. A variant of 
this situation occurred when an ex-husband and a new husband quarreled over the right to 
lay claim to the same woman’s land. These unusual situations were the source of 
consistent complaints from Indians seeking redress from the agent. Even the Omahas, 
who claimed to have no agent, were not above seeking his help under these 
circumstances.8
While some Omahas continued to deny the agent’s authority over them, others 
simply resented his assertion of it. The “precautions” of the Department, which Beck 
rigidly enforced, precluded Indians who were capable of working their land from leasing 
their allotments to others. Many preferred to lease their land for cash rather than work it 
on their own. These Indians, resentful of agency restrictions on leasing, simply went 
behind the agent’s back and dealt directly with the whites.9
Many problems had occurred because previous agents had failed to amend 
allotment records to reflect divisions of land among families in which deaths had 
occurred following the original awarding of the allotments. In one case, a widow 
continued to lease her deceased husband’s land without benefit to her children. In 
another, the son leased his deceased father’s land without sharing the proceeds with his 
widowed mother. A brother might lease land belonging to deceased parents without
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regard to other siblings who had an equal claim to it. Beck linked the trouble in all 
these situations to the dubious leasing procedures of white men and the inattention of 
previous agents.10
In general, whites did not consider the Indian’s individual title to the land when 
seeking to arrange a lease. In many cases the only formality they required to effect a 
lease with an Indian was the Indian’s “signature to some paper.” To whites, it was not 
important who the Indian happened to be; any Indian who claimed ownership of the land 
would do. In this manner white men managed to obtain leases on certain tracts o f land 
from individual Indians who legally had no claim to that particular parcel of land. Some 
illegal leases involved land belonging to as many as fifteen different Indian allottees. In 
many cases, not a single allottee with valid claim to the land in question was even 
involved in the actual lease with white men.11
Clerks at several local county offices usually recorded the leases made between 
white men and Indians. Beck found 1,227 leases on file at the Thurston County office at 
Pender, in addition to “large numbers” at West Point in Cummings County, Tekamah in 
Burt County, and a lesser number at Ponca in Dixon County. In addition to those 
recorded, whites had transacted large numbers of leases that remained off the record. In 
several cases, the original lessee had sub-leased to a third party, and the third party to a 
fourth, and so on, so that a chain of leases included as many as five separate parties. In 
most cases, the original lessee had since moved out of the state and, in some cases, the 
first or second sub-lessees could not be found either. Speculators held illegal leases 
covering huge tracts of land which they divided into dozens of smaller parcels and sub-let
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to actual settlers. To his chagrin, Beck discovered that in some cases the settler on a 
given tract of land did not even know what land he was on or who held the original lease 
to it.12
Although the Office of Indian Affairs had already issued a set of regulations for 
the proper leasing of allotted reservation land, these had been largely ignored. Since no 
agent had submitted leases involving Omaha or Winnebago allotted lands under those 
rules to the Department for approval, Beck considered all existing leases on allotted land 
to be illegal. Commissioner Daniel M. Browning instructed Beck to inform all pretended 
lessees that their leases were “null and void, and to no effect.” Subsequently, settlers 
who could meet the qualifications could apply to the agent for permission to lease their 
land under Department regulations.13
To help manage the daunting task of notifying each lessee and lessor, Beck 
prepared drafts of two separate form letters: one version for the lessee and one for the 
lessor. In plain and explicit language, each notice explained why the current lease held 
by the settler was void. It also explained the only circumstances under which settlers 
could legally lease from the Indians. In accordance with the instructions received from 
the Department, the notice ordered the lessee to arrange a legal lease through the agency 
or vacate the premises by December 31, 1893. The notice also authorized the settlers to 
harvest and remove their current crops, but specifically warned against any further 
planting until the settlers obtained a legal lease from the agent.14
Beck believed that the majority of settlers were ignorant of the illegality of their 
pretended leases. It seemed to him that the majority of settlers were honest citizens who
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had secured in good faith leases through local real estate companies or directly from 
Indians. He felt confident that most of the settlers would be willing and eager to re-lease 
lands through the agency as instructed. In reality, it was not that simple. Each settler 
faced his own set of unique problems and it was easier for some settlers to re-lease 
through the agency than others.
Many lessees who obtained land by sub-leasing through large land syndicates 
found themselves in particularly difficult situations. Beck learned that some settlers who 
wished to lease legally through the agency were nonetheless hesitant to do so since land 
companies, or in some cases local banks, still held their notes. Although the agent 
attempted to reassure these settlers that the land companies and banks had no legal 
recourse, many settlers remained unconvinced. In describing the situation to his 
superiors in Washington, Beck warned that the large lessees were resorting to “every 
trick and threat in law” to frighten their sub-lessees into submission.15
Beck’s sense of duty to protect the Indians in his charge created many enemies 
within the neighboring white communities. His rigid enforcement o f the regulations 
governing leases caused him to turn away many prospective settlers because they could 
not afford to meet the financial terms. Beck turned others away because, in his judgment, 
their presence on the reservation would be either an “injury” or at least not a benefit to 
the Indians.16 Although Beck did not specifically intend to frustrate settlers, his efforts 
often had that effect. Indignant settlers who were denied legal leases through the agency 
were likely candidates to add to the ranks of those already maintaining their illegal leases 
through the land companies.
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Finally, the new agency system strictly prohibited all speculators from acquiring 
and dealing in reservation land. Only actual “tillers of the soil,” those planning to farm 
the land as homesteaders, could lease from the Indians through the agency. The agent 
held discretion over whether the presence of a prospective white settler would be 
beneficial to the Indians. He hoped that in addition to providing a source of income for 
those Indians who needed it, the presence of hardworking and independent yeoman 
farmers would provide positive role models for the Indians. These industrious white 
neighbors would have the added effect of helping to accelerate the supposed “civilizing 
effect” that allotment advocates had promised all along. While agency leasing would 
promote this environment, it also meant that speculators and land companies operating on 
the reservation would be completely cut out of the action.
The new agency leasing system resulted in a protracted and tedious process that 
excluded many prospective lessees from getting land. The restrictions and high up front 
costs associated with leasing through the agency no doubt contributed to the decision of 
many settlers to stand behind their pretended leases and contest the agent’s actions 
against them. The prohibition against leasing allotments for speculative reasons 
encouraged powerful corporations to further scheme against the agent.
Illegal settlers were not the only ones to groan under the weight of the new 
leasing system. The paperwork at the agency concerning leases alone inundated the 
available staff, which initially consisted of only the agent and a single clerk. The clerk 
completed forms in triplicate and then sent them to Washington, D.C. for approval. 
Errors found during federal processing required that the lease be returned to the agency
60
for correction and then be resubmitted. Beck found it harder to divide his attention 
between leasing matters and the “normal” business of running the agency.
The agent’s list of priorities also included tracking down and levying fees on 
cattlemen who had been using unallotted land for grazing. The agency had not 
authorized grazing leases for 1893, but that did not prevent white ranchers from pasturing 
their cattle on Omaha land. Although the number of cattle on tribal pastures was 
considerably lower than it had been the 1892, estimated rents for use o f the land was still 
considerable. Along the same lines, the agent was eager to identify hay lands on the 
reservations and to work with individuals interested in contracting to cut the hay. Beck 
received multiple offers from whites willing to harvest hay on up to five hundred acres of 
land in a single deal. At a going rate of one dollar per acre, unallotted tribal hay land was 
a ready and renewable source of income for the Omahas.17 Since the cutting season for 
hay was at hand, Beck needed to work fast to get the contracts arranged. The agent felt 
that both of these sources of income were important to the Indians and he did not wish to 
see them lose revenue that could aid them in developing their allotments.
Beck’s efforts to manage his time was further frustrated by his need to prepare the 
annual report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, which was due by September. The 
Office required a census of the Indian population, estimates made for reservation school 
expenditures and reports, as well as investigations on various subjects pertaining to the 
overall condition of the reservations and operation of the agency. The leasing issues on 
top of regular agency business, Beck admitted, was more than he and his single clerk
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could handle. To help with the work, Beck requested the Office to send an additional 
clerk, preferably an individual with some legal experience.18
If completion of the notices swamped the agency staff, the task of delivering them 
to residents was especially problematic. The notices required delivery to illegal lessees in 
several towns and numerous locations throughout the reservations, each many miles away 
from one another. Although Pender, Bancroft and Emerson were relatively close, other 
towns such as West Point and Tekamah required longer trips. Beck understood that the 
interests of many honest settlers were at stake. Timely delivery of the notices was 
important in order to prevent settlers from incurring additional expenses on improving the 
farms they might be forced to give up. These settlers would need to relocate to other 
areas and start over if  they wished to remain on the reservation. The agent requested 
authorization to employ up to four deputies on a day-to-day basis at the expense of a 
dollar and a half a day to serve the notices.19
Unfortunately, the additional amount of work associated with the notification 
process was extremely tedious and time-consuming for the agent and his clerk. The 
agent or his clerk had to fill out each eviction notice, including an exact description of the 
land involved in the pretended lease. This meant indicating the exact section or part 
section, including the township and range in which it was located. Given the 
complexities and overall disarray of the unregulated leasing practices stretching back 
several years, this was a daunting task. It was sometimes difficult to determine the actual 
individual who currently held land through illegal lease. In many cases, these tasks 
required tedious examination of the leases available at various local county offices. Once
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the forms were completed, they required someone to perform the even more time- 
consuming task o f delivering them. Nevertheless, by October 1, 1893, the agent had 
warned all o f the illegal occupants of the Department’s ultimatum.20
The settlers were anxious to get their leases approved. Fall planting time was fast 
approaching and many felt it an undue hardship if they were prevented from getting the 
next years’ crop planted on time. The Indian lessors were also anxious for they hoped to 
lease their allotments to get money to live on before winter arrived. Although Beck 
advised those interested in leasing that he could do nothing for them until specifically 
authorized to proceed by the Department of the Interior, he indicated he was aware of 
their plight.21
This did not mean that Beck was not anxious to arrange the leases. On the 
contrary, he felt that agency leasing should begin as soon as possible. The agent hoped 
that leasing reservation land through the agency would assert the federal government’s 
authority and serve as a “source of embarrassment” to the land syndicates which assured 
their tenants that the agent had no jurisdiction. It would also provide an example to those 
whites who were unsure o f what course of action to pursue. Beck predicted that once the
agency began to lease the very land claimed by the companies, their response would
22  • confirm the rumors that they would resist his authority. Although Beck was not looking
for a fight, he probably felt the sooner the inevitable confrontation occurred, the sooner
he could assert his authority. The agent did not have a very good idea of how tenacious
and underhanded the Pender Ring could be in protecting its interests, but he would find
out soon.
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It did not take long after Beck began investigating the illegal leasing in mid-July 
for rumors of a “movement on foot” by the opposition in Pender to reach his ears. A 
“perfectly reliable source” had informed Beck that a group from Pender intended to raise 
$3,000 to fund an organization they named the Indians’ Protective Association (IPA). 
The IPA was a front for organized activity o f the land ring to thwart the agent in his 
attempt to interfere with their claims on the reservation.23 Within a month’s time the 
fund had collected $1,500 and the EPA boasted that it could raise the amount to $5,000 if 
necessary.
The opposition from Pender included individual speculators, representatives of 
land syndicates, and other Penderites who had a personal stake in limiting the agent’s 
authority. Though there were several others, the largest member by far was the Flournoy 
Live Stock and Real Estate Company. William E. Peebles served as the “mouth-piece” 
of the ring.24 Although he was the founder of Pender, the town’s first mayor, its current 
postmaster, and editor of one of the town’s newspapers, Peebles did not have a direct 
interest in the land business. His primary objective was boosting the town, a goal for 
which the cheap availability of Indian land played a large role. The Pender Ring was 
largely responsible for Agent Beck’s warm welcome earlier that summer. Although the 
Pender Ring had hoped to count Beck as one of their “friends,” he had made it clear that 
he could not be bought. Peebles had since seen the new agent as nothing more than an 
obstacle in his way.
Identified by Beck as the “advisor and schemer” for the land ring, Peebles was 
also the leader of the self-serving EPA. As editor of the Thurston County Republican,
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Peebles was in the position to influence public opinion. In late August, the Republican 
ran a story in response to the notices that agency employees had delivered to most settlers 
on the reservations.26 The paper characterized the order for settlers to vacate reservation 
lands as an “arbitrary action” on the part of the Indian Bureau. It also argued that “many 
interesting and important questions” pertaining to the Indians and Indian citizenship had 
arisen which now required interpretations from the courts. While the article conceded 
that the Indians were wards of the government, it questioned how far that guardianship 
extended. In an ominous warning, the Republican predicted that it would take more than 
the order o f the Indian Office and Captain Beck to drive settlers off the land. The Pender 
Ring meant to fight to the end.27
The Flournoy Company instructed its lawyer, H. C. Brome of Omaha, to secure 
an injunction from the United States District Court of Nebraska. As Beck understood it, 
the purpose of the injunction was to prevent him from delivering eviction notices to the 
company’s sub-lessees. Since such an injunction would obstruct the action o f the federal 
government, Beck could not understand how a state judge could properly grant it. 
Nevertheless, late on the evening of October 11, 1893, U.S. Marshal Frank E. White 
served the agent with an injunction to that effect. Judge Elmer S. Dundy granted the 
injunction based on the Flournoy Company’s bill of complaint.
The injunction ordered Beck to refrain from interfering in any manner with the 
Flournoy Company or any of its tenants in the use and possession of the lands leased by 
them. This included more than 30,000 acres of land located on the Winnebago 
Reservation. At the same time, Marshal White also served Beck with a subpoena
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commanding him to appear in front o f the circuit court in Omaha on November 6. 
During the following few days, Beck wrote to the clerk of the court and requested a copy 
of the complainant’s bill so that he could prepare a proper response. He also contacted 
United States District Attorney Benjamin S. Baker, seeking his advice in the matter. 
Finally, he notified the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of what had happened and
• 9Qrequested instructions on how to proceed.
Based upon what he had seen in the language of the injunction, Beck was 
confident that the Flournoy Company’s case was extremely tenuous. The agent was 
certain he would have no difficulty proving the basis of its claim to be false. In the bill of 
complaint, Brome asserted that the Winnebagos, having been allotted land in severalty, 
were citizens and had severed their tribal relations with the United States Government.
•'5 A
The Winnebagos, he claimed, no longer existed as a tribe. Beck knew this to be false. 
The Indians did not own their land yet because the Secretary of the Interior had neither 
approved the allotments nor issued any patents for them. Until the Secretary approved 
the leases, the proposed allotments remained classified as tribal lands. The tribal status of 
the Winnebagos and the tribes’ relationship to the federal government thus remained 
intact.31
District Attorney Baker neglected to respond to Beck’s repeated communications 
concerning the suit. The agent confided in the Commissioner that he did not expect any 
assistance from Baker.32 This was unfortunate since Beck was anxious to get the 
injunction dissolved as quickly as possible. In order to prevent further delay, he 
requested that the Commissioner designate special counsel to advise him on procedure
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and act as his attorney in the matter. If  the Office could not arrange to send someone, 
Beck requested permission to acquire a local attorney to assist him. Whatever the Office 
decided, Beck realized the latest events had turned the tables against him and he felt that 
only prompt legal action could correct the situation.
The damage was done. Judge Dundy’s grant for injunction against the agent 
established a legal precedent that lent an air of credibility to the Flournoy Company’s 
claims against the federal government’s authority over the disputed land. Beck now 
realized that the Flournoy Company intended to make good on its threat to bog the matter 
down in court. The company welcomed the inevitable delay that would result. It is also 
likely that Beck fully realized the extent of the Company’s tactics. His sense of urgency 
to have the case settled as quickly as possible indicates that he recognized that even the 
Flournoy Company understood that it did not really need to win the case to beat the 
agent. They were already winning.
With no legal support forthcoming from Washington, D. C. or the state district 
attorney’s office, Agent Beck decided to focus his attention on matters where he still 
maintained some clear authority. This amounted to proceeding with evictions of illegal 
lessees who did not yet enjoy the protection of state-ordered injunctions. Quick action 
was necessary to recover as much land as possible for the Indians before more settlers 
had the chance to secure injunctions. The more land recovered from illegal lessees, the 
more land the agent could legally lease through the agency and thereby obtain a fair price 
for the Omahas and Winnebagos. Unfortunately, Beck was still unsure about how to 
proceed with the evictions.
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One of the major grievances in the Flournoy Company bill o f complaint was that 
the agent intended to use force to remove the settlers. This accusation, though 
completely unfounded at the time, had garnered a large amount of public sympathy for 
the Flournoy settlers. In the opinion of many whites, including those of the state court, 
even if the Flournoy leases were invalid (a point which they denied), the agent still
'X'Xneeded to obtain orders of ejection through due process of law.
While Beck understood his authority through the Department o f the Interior to 
include that eviction power, he was nonetheless hesitant to do so at the risk of further 
alienating public opinion and strengthening support for the land syndicates. 
Unfortunately, the alternative meant seeking the assistance of the district attorney’s office 
and filing individual suits o f ejection for each individual case. Even had Beck enjoyed 
the cooperation of the district attorney’s office, the matter would still have been costly 
and time consuming. Under the circumstances, the agent hoped that the Department of 
Justice would grant him permission to proceed with the evictions under its authority. 
This would legitimize his actions with due process and eliminate the time-consuming 
process o f directing each case through the various government agencies in Washington.34
In hopes of setting a precedent, Beck forwarded to the Commissioner what he felt 
was the most clear-cut case of illegal leasing. A man named George F. Phillips had 
illegally leased a section of allotted land from an Omaha Indian. Beck informed Phillips 
that he needed to re-lease the land through the agency or vacate. Since Phillips was 
unable to re-lease the land under the agency’s terms, he agreed to vacate. Beck had 
subsequently re-leased the land in question to another white, Franklin J. Coil, and the
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Secretary of the Interior had approved the lease. When Coil attempted to take possession 
of the land, however, Phillips still occupied it and refused to leave. Phillips had thrown 
his lot in with the land companies, claiming his original lease was legal and that the agent 
had no authority to remove him. Beck hoped that official permission from Washington, 
D. C. to proceed with the eviction of Phillips would demonstrate the legitimacy of the 
agent’s authority to evict trespassers from the reservation without having to secure orders 
through local courts.
While waiting for a decision to that effect, Beck continued to apply for individual 
evictions, but this process was slow and expensive. Filing the required paperwork at the 
courthouse included paying fees in each separate case. Since no regulations covered the 
use of agency funds for that purpose, procedure required that the agent write for 
permission to the Office o f Indian Affairs. The Commissioner then forwarded the request 
to the Department o f the Interior, which in turn forwarded it to the Department o f Justice. 
The Attorney General then approved it and forwarded the information to the district 
attorney’s office in Lincoln, Nebraska . Only then could the district attorney secure the 
necessary paperwork to proceed with legal evictions. Although individual cases posed no 
great amount o f bureaucratic red tape, collectively the situation was daunting because the 
agent faced hundreds of potential cases. If  the procedure was not changed, it would 
greatly hamper the agent’s efforts to clear the two reservations of illegal settlers.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DETERMINED ADVERSARIES
“The acts of this Company show a determined effort to continue their unlawful leasing 
and possession of the land which have to be met by continued determination against 
them.”1
John R. Beck
Acting Agent, Omaha and Winnebago Agency 
December 18, 1894
Beyond the legal complications of dealing with illegal leasing, Agent William 
Beck worked tirelessly to arrange new, legal leases for the benefit of the Indians. This 
task expanded to include leases on unallotted Omaha tribal lands for grazing and farming 
purposes. A number of Omahas, anticipating future allotments, had claimed specific 
tracts o f unallotted land for their children, and had subsequently leased this unallotted 
land to whites. At the time, the Secretary of the Interior had not yet authorized the 
leasing of unallotted lands and therefore Beck immediately classified this category of 
settlers as illegal. They were among the first group of individuals that Beck had notified 
during the previous year to vacate by December 31, 1893. Upon notification, however, 
the great majority o f these settlers had come to the agent requesting permission to lease 
legally through the agency under Department rules. Beck informed them that he would 
present their case before the Department, but he could make no promises.
Other whites had also demonstrated interest in such possibilities and the agent 
could see no reason not to accommodate them as long as the Department o f the Interior
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approved. He believed it would serve to increase revenues for the Indians. The settlers 
would also break land for farming and otherwise improve the lands that would, under 
previous conditions, have remained idle. This would increase the value of the land and 
make it easier for future Indian allottees to begin working their land once the leases 
expired.
Beck was aware of one possible problem in this arrangement. The Indian 
Appropriation Act of March 3, 1893, had amended the Act o f August 7, 1882, to allow 
for additional allotments to the Omahas.4 The agent knew that the Office o f Indian 
Affairs was anticipating authorization from the Department to conduct another allotment 
in the near future. If  this occurred, valid leases on the land would potentially complicate 
the allotment process. At the time Beck had no instructions on the matter, and he thus 
requested permission to lease Omaha tribal land for one-year grazing terms or three-year 
farming terms.5 At the Secretary’s discretion, Beck was willing to lease either formally 
through regular leases, or informally, in which case the leases would end in case of 
further allotment. He simply wanted to know what the Department desired him to do so 
that he could either take steps to lease the land or take steps to evict the present settlers.6 
On March 14, Secretary of the Interior Hoke Smith authorized the agent to lease 
unallotted land informally for one-year terms, beginning May 1, 1894. The Secretary 
specified that the Omahas had to agree to the leasing arrangements and that the leases 
would remain subject to future allotments.7
The situation concerning unallotted land was more complicated on the Winnebago 
reservation. Beck had found out what Agent Ashley had already known. A “secret
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committee” of Winnebago Indians, including Alexander Payer, Alex St. Cyr, Joseph 
Lamere and Thomas Decora, had already leased the majority o f unallotted land on the 
reservation. Most of the land was under control o f the Flournoy Live Stock and Real 
Estate Company and the other large land companies. The agent was busy determining 
the location of unallotted land unaffected by the five injunctions against him. Only alter
o
he could determine what land was available would he begin to arrange leases for it. 
Beck was dismayed when he later found out that only a small portion of the eastern 
extreme of the Winnebago reservation was available for leasing. He suggested that the 
Department give him permission to lease this land “informally” to cattlemen.9 The 
Secretary granted approval to lease the available unallotted land under conditions very 
similar to those granted to the Omahas. Each potential lessee could only use the land for 
grazing purposes and at a minimum price of twenty-five cents an acre. The lease had to 
be informal in nature, good only for a period of one year beginning May 1, and it 
required the prior approval of the Winnebago Council.10
On September 1, 1893, while examining the agency records for delinquent 
lessees, Beck discovered that Rosalie Farley, an Omaha Indian, was past due on her May 
1 payment for a lease on approximately 22,000 acres of Omaha grazing land.11 Agent 
Ashley had arranged the original lease, and the Omaha tribe had agreed to lease the land 
to Rosalie Farley. Her latest five-year payment o f $5,408.04 was now overdue. Rosalie 
had made it known that she intended to sub-let the land and contract for cattle. Edward 
Farley, Rosalie’s husband and a white man, acted as her agent and manager in the
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business. He had contracted with a number of whites to graze their cattle on the land the 
coming year.12
Almost immediately problems with the lease became evident. Several Indian 
families were living on the land and they had broken over six hundred acres of it for 
farming. Anticipating future allotments, other Indians had marked out claims for their 
children on the lands. All of this violated Rosalie Farley’s rights to the land for grazing
1 'Xpurposes as stated in her lease. The Omaha tribal council had even filed suit against her 
in the circuit court, demanding cancellation of the lease.14 Beck later found out that 
William Peebles and Henry Fontenelle, an Omaha and long-time enemy of the La Flesche 
family, had told the tribe that as long as the Farley lease was in effect, it would prevent 
the Department o f the Interior from making new allotments. Peebles convinced the tribal 
council that they had to revoke the lease or the Omahas would suffer. Peebles had 
circulars printed and distributed around the area, making sure that Edward Farley’s 
potential customers received copies. Claiming that the Farley lease o f Omaha 
pasturelands had expired, the notice warned that any livestock found on the land after 
May 1, 1893, would be confiscated and held for damages by the tribe. Ten council 
members apparently signed the notice. Rosalie told Beck that she had offered to make 
the payment to Agent Ashley if  he would guarantee to protect her rights in the lease, but 
Ashley had refused to do so.15
By spreading the circulars, as well as publishing notices in local newspapers, the 
Indians’ Protection Association hoped to prevent Rosalie from being able to sub-lease the 
land. The tactic had a tremendous effect on the Farley’s business. Of the 22,000 acres in
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the original lease, the Farleys only managed to pull in revenue from 7,000 acres. O f the 
sub-leases made, one for 200 acres had been broken for farming by the sub-lessees. 
Edward Farley alleged that the Omahas had induced the men who had broken the land to 
do so in order to violate the terms of the Farley lease.16 The Omaha council, consisting 
o f Fire Chief, Sin-de-ha-ha, Prairie Chicken, White Horse, Jessie Fremont, Du-ba-moni, 
Zhinga-ga-he-ga, Wa-ha-nin-ga, Big Elk and Little Cook, filed suit in the circuit court on 
May 11, 1893. The Farleys obtained legal representation from the Omaha firm of 
Breckenridge and Breckenridge.17
Although in the beginning some of the illegal lessees had cut their losses and 
moved off the reservations, many had remained, and resistance to Agent Beck’s authority 
was growing stronger with each passing day. As long as it appeared that the. Flournoy 
Company held the upper hand, illegal settlers were little concerned with the agent’s 
threats. Beck was determined to counter their tactics with prompt action. Rather than 
wait on the Commissioner’s response to his request for counsel, Beck took the initiative 
to line up a local attorney. He sent a letter that same day to Ralph W. Breckenridge of 
the firm Breckenridge and Breckenridge of Omaha, the same firm employed by the 
Farleys.
The Flournoy Company, having political and social ties with the white 
community, was able to exert its influence in the local courts. The fact that the Flournoy 
Company was able to obtain the preliminary injunction in the first place indicated the 
attitude of the state courts in the matter. If the case was to receive a fair hearing, it was 
necessary to go beyond the state court. Under the circumstances, the best option was to
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submit the case before the Circuit Court o f Appeals in St. Paul, Minnesota. Only then 
could Beck hope to get the injunction dissolved. Attorney Ralph W. Breckenridge agreed 
that that course of action offered the best chance of success.18
Beck had to act quickly in order to arrange for that to happen before he was 
required to answer the subpoena in early November.19 Although the deadline for his 
answer at the district court in Omaha loomed only two weeks away, Beck still had heard 
nothing from the Office of Indian Affairs concerning his request for special counsel in the 
case. Growing impatient, he urgently repeated his request to the Commissioner. If 
District Attorney Benjamin S. Baker must have charge of the case, then Beck strongly 
advised the Commissioner to secure a special assistant for the case. The agent insisted 
that Baker was too preoccupied with other matters to give the injunction suit the attention 
it required. He also suspected Baker of secretly aiding the Flournoy Company by
unnecessarily delaying the case. Each delay weakened his and the federal government’s
20authority in the matter while strengthening the opposition m Pender.
Beck made it clear that he did not trust Baker to argue the case in the best 
interests of the federal government. As chairman of the recent Republican State 
Convention, Baker associated with a delegation of private local supporters that included 
prominent men such as John Lemmon, John Myers and Arthur Turner — the Flournoy 
Company’s president, treasurer and secretary, respectively.21 Once the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs realized the implications o f this relationship, he would better understand 
Beck’s reluctance to have the case solely in the hands of Baker. Beck intimated
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somewhat sarcastically that he was willing to leave the outcome of the case completely in
9 9Baker’s hands unless the Office instructed the agent otherwise.
The agent’s lack of confidence in Baker’s enthusiasm to pursue the case against 
the Flournoy Company was well founded. Several days later Beck received a letter from 
the district attorney in which he voiced his opinion that the argument as laid out in the
9 ^Company’s bill o f complaint had some merit. Baker agreed with Flournoy Attorney H. 
C. Brome’s argument that the Act of Congress of 1863 made the Indians citizens of the 
United States. The courts had not yet construed any of the later acts specifically 
mentioned by the complainant’s bill. These subsequent acts remained open to 
interpretation. Baker felt that it was the courts’ rightful place to decide the meaning of 
laws, not the Department of the Interior, the Indian Office, or the agent.
That Baker did not fully grasp the magnitude of the situation was apparent. 
Completely missing the critical issue, he placed the essence of the debate on the question 
o f whether or not the original Flournoy Company leases were made for one year or for 
five. The real issues, Beck understood, had absolutely nothing to do with the terms o f the 
leases. Baker wrote a bold and patronizing letter to Beck in which he condescendingly 
recommended that the agent get all his facts straight. Only after Beck had taken the time 
to “fully digest the whole matter” would Baker be willing to meet the agent in Lincoln to 
prepare a response to the complainant’s bill. The furious agent endorsed the back o f the 
letter and forwarded it to the Commissioner as proof that Baker was unsuitable to argue 
the case on the behalf o f the interests of the United States.24 By this time, Secretary of 
the Interior Hoke Smith had already forwarded the agent’s request that the Justice
79
Department assign a special assistant to the case. United States Attorney General 
Richard Olney, however, denied the request, stating that it was his judgment there was 
“no need.”25
Whether he liked it or not, Beck would have to make do with Baker as counsel. 
On November 7, 1893, Agent Beck appeared in Omaha before the United States Circuit 
Court, with District Attorney Baker by his side. Baker had prepared an answer to the 
complaint based largely on materials the agent had compiled and drafted in the weeks 
after the injunction. Beck’s detailed reply explained the position of the Department 
concerning the leasing of reservation lands, and refuted point by point each aspect o f the 
argument as set out by Brome in his bill o f complaint. The explanation Beck provided 
thoroughly repudiated the complainants’ argument. Although the district attorney never 
admitted it, Beck believed that the expression on Baker’s face betrayed his realization 
that the views of the Department were correct. Even after the district attorney moved that
the court dissolve the injunction, Beck still did not trust that Baker would vigorously
26pursue the case. The clerk set the date for hearing the motion on November 20, 1893.
The hearing date had come and gone and a week had passed with no word from 
Baker about the case. Beck proceeded to Omaha on November 27 to find out what was 
causing the delay. Baker explained that Judge Elmer S. Dundy had granted the 
complainants time to obtain their own affidavits in response to Beck’s affidavit, and that 
the court had still not set a firm date for the hearing. Annoyed by what he felt were 
unwarranted delays, Beck warned the Commissioner that further delays could only injure 
United States interests in the case.27
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Reportedly, executives of the Flournoy Company had boasted that the case might 
experience delays amounting to two years or more. During that time, the injunction 
against Beck would serve to protect the Company, which would continue to profit at the 
expense of the Indians. The original leases they held were set to expire on January 1, 
1896 anyway. By the time the case was over, even a favorable verdict for the federal 
government would prove to be a dead letter. The Company would have achieved its
9 Qgoals through its delay tactics.
Beck began to worry even more in early December when it became evident that 
the circuit court routinely prosecuted criminal cases before considering cases involving
9 0civil matters. The thirty-first of December, the deadline for illegal settlers to vacate, 
was fast approaching and at the rate things were going the Flournoy injunction would 
prevent Beck from enforcing the notices. Beck asked the Commissioner to do what he
TOcould to influence the Department o f Justice to push for an early hearing.
The land companies had reassured their tenants that the federal government could 
not interfere with their leases. In order to boost the Indians’ welfare, as well as rattle the 
confidence of the land companies and their tenants, Beck struggled to find a legal way to 
remove the settlers from the reservations. Although the agent considered pursuing formal 
legal action against each non-Flournoy lessee on the reservations, he eventually 
dismissed this idea as impractical. From his experience with the local courts, the process 
would take so long as to “ . . . practically amount to leaving the lessees alone
T1indefinitely.” The process would hardly be worth the effort and expense.
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Although Beck had planned to exercise his authority to eject settlers not covered 
by the Flournoy Company injunction, he found that his Indian police were not reliable. 
They were afraid to use force against white men because of the local courts. The agent 
complained that outside of tracking down truant pupils from the reservation schools or 
apprehending individual timber thieves, the Indian police were useless. Beck realized 
that unless something changed soon the government’s authority on the reservations 
would be destroyed.32
The agent went so far as to suggest that the Department send a troop of cavalry to 
the reservations with orders to remove the trespassers. He specifically suggested cavalry, 
because infantry would not be able to move around quickly enough. Since the injunction 
only applied to him, the local courts could not charge the commanding military officer 
with contempt of court for acting on independent orders to evict trespassers from the 
reservation. Beck believed that such a move by the government would go far to 
undermine the land companies’ control over their tenants and help reassert federal
• ITauthority on the reservations.
Since the delays experienced in the judicial system were allowing the Flournoy 
Company to gain ground in the leasing dispute, Beck began to explore other options. The 
present injunction only prevented the agent from interfering with the Flournoy Company 
and its sub-lessees. Otherwise, only about twenty-five illegal settlers had voluntarily left 
the Omaha Reservation, and many of those who remained, sided with the free-leasing 
advocates operating from Pender.34 The apparent effectiveness of the Flournoy
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Company’s resistance in the courts had emboldened other settlers who leased their 
reservation land from other large companies or directly from the Indians.
Other large land companies especially took note of the Flournoy Company’s 
successful tactics and quickly began to emulate them by filing their own suits. Beck 
received notice o f an injunction from the district court on January 6, 1894, restraining
• 'X S  • • • •him from interfering with lands leased by Ernest J. Smith. This second injunction 
prevented the agent from interfering with an additional 4,960 acres o f Winnebago land 
held by illegal leases to Smith. This did not bother Beck nearly as much as the fact that 
the same court that delayed hearing his answer to the first suit had issued an additional 
injunction on the same grounds. Beck warned the Commissioner o f Indian Affairs that 
the action of the court further served to increase the contempt in which many white 
settlers held the authority o f the United States.36
The Flournoy case still did not have a court date by the end of January. Judge 
Dundy had, however, granted injunctions to two additional land companies -  B. T. Hull 
and Sons and Wheeler and Chittenden. The agent’s previous request that Baker acquire 
and forward a copy of Ernest Smith’s bill of complaint had remained unanswered. 
Baker’s term in office had expired and his replacement had not been named. Although 
the U. S. Attorney General’s office had written Baker and requested that he continue to
^  Q
act as counsel for Beck until the new district attorney arrived, Baker was unavailable. 
Assistant District Attorney H. H. Baldridge was reluctant to take charge o f the cases since 
he expected the new district attorney to arrive any day. In the meantime, Beck received a 
fifth injunction, preventing his interference with lands leased by John B. Carey. These
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latest events had convinced Beck that his chance of winning a favorable decision from 
the local courts was unlikely.
By early April 1894, Beck had completed responses to the additional injunction 
cases against him and forwarded them to the assistant district attorney. A few days later 
Baldridge acknowledged receipt of the agent’s affidavits and advised Beck that the court 
had ordered testimony in the cases to be taken in Pender.40 This news alarmed Beck 
because he felt that it indicated that Judge Dundy was already planning to hear the case in 
court. Beck was especially upset because Dundy had not yet responded to his repeated 
requests to have the injunction dissolved, and at this point it seemed that the judge had no 
intention of doing so. Brome, the Flournoy Company’s lawyer, was already preparing to 
gather evidence in anticipation of the case going to trial. Beck wondered why Brome 
would make preparations for a case that might never go to court. He suspected Brome 
already knew that Dundy did not intend to dissolve the injunction. What the agent did 
not know at the time was that Baker had already made a deal with Brome, agreeing that 
he would not push the motion to dissolve the temporary injunction before the case went 
to court on its merits. With this privileged information, the Flournoy Company could 
then reassure its sub-lessees that the injunction would protect them until the trial. 
Meanwhile, to buy more time, the Company probably exerted its influence with Dundy 
and Baker to ensure that they delayed the case as long as possible. When the case finally 
came up for decision, the Company could count on Dundy’s judgment in favor o f the 
Flournoy Company.41
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Beck made a trip to the district attorney’s office in Omaha to find out why the 
district court had not heard the motion for the dissolution of the injunctions. When Beck 
confronted Baldridge, the assistant district attorney admitted that Baker had “neglected” 
to push the matter. Baker tried to explain why the motions had not been heard, but Beck 
was tired of the former district attorney’s excuses. The latter insisted that if  Dundy 
would not hear the cases, then Judge Henry C. Caldwell or Judge Walter S. Sanborn 
would. The agent complained that if the court had the time to hear evidence on the 
Flournoy Case in preparation for trial, then the court should have time to hear his motion 
to dissolve the injunction.42
Baker spoke with Dundy the following day and the judge agreed to postpone the 
hearing of evidence until April 19. Five days later, Dundy also agreed to hear the motion 
to dissolve the injunction. Although Beck preferred not to have Dundy hear the motion, 
he was glad that the matter was finally getting some attention. Or so he thought. On 
April 19, Beck proceeded to Pender in order to hear the taking of testimony in the 
Flournoy Case, but neither the plaintiff nor the judge had shown up. Beck stayed the 
night at Pender and the next morning received a telegram informing him that the taking 
of testimony was postponed. He returned to the agency to find a letter from Breckenridge 
stating that the hearing scheduled for the previous day was postponed because Judge 
Dundy was ill. Breckenridge also informed the agent that the hearing scheduled for April 
24 to dissolve the injunction was also postponed for the same reason. Breckenridge 
decided to write to Judge Caldwell and request that he hear the case instead. 43
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On April 23, Beck received a telegram from St. Paul, Minnesota announcing that 
Judge Sanborn would hear the motion for dissolution of the injunction on May 2, 1894. 
Although Breckenridge had written to Judge Caldwell, the two judges had made 
arrangements that separated their workload into geographical districts, and Nebraska fell 
under Sanborn’s area of responsibility.44 Beck, Breckenridge and Sawyer all traveled to 
St. Paul for the hearing. After a long delay, it appeared as though Beck had finally gotten 
things the way he had wanted them. His hope was short lived. Having heard the case, 
Judge Sanborn declined to dissolve the injunction on May 3.45
Sanborn based his decision partly upon the fact that the Department o f Justice had 
been so slow to act on the matter. The motion for dissolution was first filed on 
November 18, 1893, but it had taken until May 2, 1894 for the case to be heard. 
Although Beck had submitted an affidavit outlining his repeated efforts to have the case 
heard earlier, Sanborn decided that it was the federal government’s responsibility to push 
the case, not the agent’s. According to Beck, Sanborn implied that had the Department of 
Justice pushed the case earlier in 1893, he would have readily dissolved the injunction. 
Considering that affected settlers had already planted for the season and the case would 
soon be going to court on its merits anyway, there was little reason for dissolving the 
injunction now. Finally, although Sanborn did not dispute that the United States still held 
title to the land, he was unsure whether the agent could lawfully use force to remove 
settlers from the reservation.46
Instead of dissolving the injunction, Sanbom allowed it to 3tand, but he modified 
it slightly to allow the government to eject settlers through the courts. The modified
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order prohibited Beck and his subordinates from “interfering with or disturbing” the 
Flournoy Company or any of its sub-lessees in the possession or use of the land covered 
by the bill o f complaint except through “suits or actions in proper Courts.”47 
Understandably, Beck was disappointed at Sanborn’s ruling. In effect, the only 
concession Beck received was the ability to eject Flournoy sub-lessees through due 
process of law in the courts. Beck had already decided it was not worthwhile to proceed 
in that direction even with illegal settlers who did not enjoy the protection of an 
injunction.
Beck understood that his true enemies were the land syndicates, not the individual 
settlers. Rather than attack the settlers, he sought ways to attack the Flournoy Company 
directly. The Company’s injunction had been used so effectively against him, he thought 
that one might prove equally effective against the Company. He suggested that the 
Department of Justice direct the district attorney to file for an injunction against the 
Flournoy Company. This maneuver would restrain them from using the land “in any 
way” and prevent them from receiving rents until the case was decided in the courts. 
This would prohibit the company from re-leasing any land that Beck opened and would 
effectively prevent the Company from earning additional profits on future rents. Beck 
happily reported that the new district attorney, Andrew J. Sawyer, would be willing to 
cooperate in such an endeavor, his views being “identical” to those expressed by the 
Department.48
Whatever the Department of the Interior decided on that issue, Beck emphasized 
the need to have the hearing of the case be pushed by the Department of Justice.
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Breckenridge and Beck had assembled the evidence for the defense and had filed all the 
necessary documents with the court by May 23.49 They planned to request that Circuit 
Justice David J. Brewer, due to arrive in Omaha on June 11, preside over the trial. The 
U. S. Attorney General assured the Secretary of the Interior that he would hasten the 
proceedings by “every means” in his power.50 Sawyer assured Olney that he and 
Breckenridge were doing everything they could to push the case to trial.51
Although Beck and his lawyers had hoped to have Justice Brewer hear the case, 
Breckenridge later confided to Beck that there was “a kind o f an understanding” between 
Brewer and Dundy that they would not hear one another’s cases without the other’s 
consent.52 Apparently Dundy wanted to preside over this case himself and Judge Brewer 
declined to accept the case. Judge Dundy was out o f town at the time, not scheduled to 
return until June 27. Breckenridge suggested that Beck be in Omaha when Dundy 
arrived because together they might persuade the judge to hear the case promptly. Upon 
his return to Omaha, Dundy insisted on hearing the backlog o f criminal cases before 
directing his attention to civil suits.53 He set the hearing on the Flournoy Case for July 
10, 1894.
On that day, Judge Dundy provided each side one hour to present its case, 
including all testimony, before he retired to make his decision. Four days later he ruled 
in favor o f the plaintiff and ordered that Agent Beck and his subordinates “be and are 
forever enjoined and restrained from interfering with or disturbing the complainant or his 
lessees in the possession or use of the lands described in the complaint” except through 
suits or actions through the courts.54 In other words, Dundy confirmed Sanborn’s
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modified injunction and made it permanent. To add insult to injury, Dundy had assessed 
the costs o f the suit to Beck.
In explaining his decision, Dundy stated that it did not matter to him whether or 
not the Winnebagos were citizens or whether or not the leases made between them and 
the Flournoy Company were legal. As far as he was concerned, since the government 
had tolerated the illegal leases for the past three years without taking steps to remove the 
settlers, it would be unfair to evict them by force now.55 Dundy further ruled that 
military force could not be employed to forcibly remove citizens from the land during 
peace time. If the agent desired to have the settlers removed, he must file an individual 
suit in ejectment and obtain a writ of possession through the courts. After that a U.S. 
marshal would serve the writ and evict the settler.56
Beck did not understand why Dundy placed such great emphasis on the use of 
force to remove the settlers. There was no proof that the government threatened or 
intended to use force. Rumors had spread in the local newspaper that Beck might use 
force, and indeed he was contemplating it, but nothing ever happened. Furthermore, the 
agent did not intend to take any action until due process o f law was obtained. Beck 
pointed out that Dundy made no reference or decision as to the title or rights of the 
United States concerning the land.57 It is likely that Dundy avoided the real issues 
involved in the suit because to rule against the interests of so many settlers and the 
influence o f the land syndicates would have made him very unpopular in the community. 
Rather than take responsibility for a decision that would hurt the white citizens and help 
the Indians, Dundy decided to let higher courts take the blame.
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According to Breckenridge, Judge Dundy held the view that neither the agent nor 
the United States Government had authority to exercise control over the allotted 
Winnebago families or their allotments under the Dawes Severalty Act. Inexplicably, 
Dundy chose to ignore the fact that the bill expressly stated that any contracts involving 
the allotments during the twenty-five year trust period were “null and void.” Beck and 
Breckenridge concluded that Dundy had made up his mind in the matter long before the 
case had even made it to court. Beck even claimed that Dundy had said that he had given 
the case “as full consideration as he cared to give it” before he granted the original
ro
injunction. Dundy, probably acting under the influence of the Penderites, had issued 
the original temporary injunction, played along with the Penderites scheme of delaying 
the matter, and finally, after being forced to hear the case, presented a decision that the 
Flournoy Company had probably known he would make all along. The agent complained 
to his superiors about the decision, reminding them that he had predicted that a trial 
before Dundy “would apt to result in an adverse decision.”59
When Beck had first arrived at the Omaha and Winnebago Agency, he had 
expected to encounter some difficulties with the illegal leasing. His instructions from the 
Office o f Indian Affairs were clear, to put an end to the illegal leasing that cheated the 
Indians and prevented them from making progress in the white man’s ways. In his 
pursuit of justice, he was supposed to create a new system of leasing based on agency 
enforcement o f regulations authorized by the Department of the Interior. Yet, his steps in 
that direction had provoked opposition from powerful land syndicates operating chiefly 
out of nearby Pender, Nebraska. During the previous several years, these companies had
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grown rich by taking advantage of the Indians’ naivete and exploiting their lands. To 
preserve their lucrative leasing arrangements the syndicates influenced local and state 
courts to issue injunctions restraining the agent from interfering with their schemes.
Through selective and manipulative interpretation of the laws pertaining to Indian 
citizenship, land syndicates such as the Flournoy Company purposely confused state and 
federal jurisdictions over Indian lands. Meanwhile, the Pender Ring’s Indians’ 
Protective Association spread propaganda through rumors and in the local newspapers. 
Countless delays postponed settlement of the issue while injunctions prevented the Indian 
agent from interfering with the companies’ possession of Indian lands. Agent Beck 
lamented that each day which passed without a ruling from the local courts weakened the 
federal government’s authority to protect the Indian estate. In addition, when the case 
was finally heard, Judge Elmer Dundy’s ruling in favor of the Flournoy Company 
avoided the real issues and ensured the opportunity for even more delays.
The Dundy decision was a setback, but Beck was determined to fight on. Beck, 
Breckenridge and Sawyer agreed unanimously that Dundy’s decision was faulty and that 
the case must be appealed.60 In little over a week after Dundy’s adverse ruling, U. S. 
Attorney General Richard Olney advised Sawyer to proceed with an appeal immediately. 
By the end of August, Breckenridge, acting in official capacity as Special Assistant to the 
U.S. District Attorney for Nebraska, had completed the appeal and the case was set to be 
heard by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, in St. Louis, 
Missouri. Judge Amos Thayer of the circuit court of appeals set the hearing for 
December 3, 1894.61 Beck attempted unsuccessfully to get the case advanced for an early
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hearing. His failure to do so allowed the Flournoy Company to deprive the Indians o f 
their land for at least five more months. In the meantime, all the agent could do was 
prosecute individual cases and wait for his case to be heard by the court of appeals in 
Saint Louis.
The immediate success o f the Flournoy Company was as detrimental to the 
Indians’ best interests as it was a source of “much trouble” to the agency in leasing 
matters. The Flournoy victory in Omaha bolstered the position of the “free-leasing” 
advocates in Pender. In the months following the Dundy decision, prospective white 
settlers sought to lease Indian land on easy terms through the Flournoy Company rather 
than through the restrictive agency system. The decision even encouraged some settlers 
to back out o f their contracts through the agency and revert to their old leases through the 
land companies or the directly with the Indians. One such case involved a Winnebago 
named Ulysses S. Grant and a white man named John D. McKinnie.
On February 8, 1894, Beck had arranged a lease between Grant and McKinnie for 
land allotted to three of Grant’s minor children. The Secretary of the Interior approved 
the lease on August 21. Near the end of September, Grant notified Beck that McKinnie’s 
rent was past due. The agent sent a notice to McKinnie informing him to pay the past 
due amount or the agent would have to take “action” against him immediately.62 
McKinnie responded by stating that he held a prior lease directly from Grant and that 
under its terms he was completely paid up and owed Grant nothing. He claimed that his 
previous lease gave him “as good a claim” to his land as the Flournoy Company had on
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its land. McKinnie repudiated the agency lease and insisted that until the original lease 
was declared void, he would continue to hold the land under it instead.
Beck requested the necessary authorization from the Secretary of the Interior to 
proceed with legal action to evict McKinnie and sue for the balance o f the unpaid rent 
due under the agency lease. He emphasized the importance of prompt action in this 
particular case, as it would help “ . . . put an end numerous others which are likely to 
arise.”64 In what illustrates yet another example of the bureaucratic red tape the agent 
had to deal with, the Comissioner replied that Grant had to personally request the 
Secretary to approve action on his behalf.65
The agent believed that the Interior Department had to make it clear that it would 
protect Indians leasing through the agency and that whites would not get away with 
cheating them. Beck felt it was important to evict McKinnie immediately, even though 
past due rent would be lost. The agent wanted the McKinnie case to be an example. 
McKinnie5s actions demonstrated that he was not the type of person whose presence on 
the reservation would be beneficial to Indians. He had shown that he was willing to take 
advantage of the Indians and had defied the authority of the agency. Beck complained 
that there were a number of other cases very similar to this one. He was aware that some 
whites were taking advantage of the Indians5 ignorance by inducing them to accept 
payments under the old lease. Beck lamented that the Indians did not realize that by 
accepting payment under the old lease that they were considering it binding. Whites 
could use this as evidence in the courts to defend their claim to the legality of the lease.
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Beck felt that if  the Department failed to take immediate action against McKinnie, it 
would only encourage other whites to do the same.66
Although Beck was determined to bring a halt to the illegal leasing occurring on 
the reservations, he found his authority as agent continually questioned. Land syndicates 
such as the Flournoy Company were instrumental in stirring up popular resistance against 
the agent. The syndicates’ efforts were bolstered by unscrupulous town boosters from 
nearby Pender. Beck realized he had inherited a daunting position from his predecessor. 
Although the agent worked tirelessly to place the leasing business under agency 
supervision, his efforts were confounded by sympathetic local courts. Beck’s superiors in 
Washington, D. C. had made it clear to the agent that the only way to stamp out the 
corruption and protect the Indians from the rapacity o f the land grabbers was through the 
justice system. The agent’s experience with Judge Dundy, however, indicated that that 
route would be long and difficult. Despite his frustrations, Beck realized that his chances 
for a fair trial would greatly increase once the case was heard by outside judges free of 
entanglements with local politics.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMER OF DISCONTENT 
“I shall represent the fact that there is law enough, if  it is enforced.”1
William H. Reck
Omaha and Winnebago Indian Agent 
July 19, 1895
The case finally reached the United States Circuit Court o f Appeals in Saint 
Louis, Missouri, on December 10, 1894. Judges Henry C. CaldwelTs and Amos 
Thayer’s ruling effectively reversed Judge Elmer Dundy’s earlier decision and dismissed 
the Flournoy Company’s complaint. They ruled that there was no reason that Congress 
could not declare Indians to be citizens of the United States while it temporarily retained 
title to their land in trust. The rights implied by citizenship did not include the right to 
administer land without reference to the character o f the title under which it was held. 
The judges reasoned that the provision in the sixth section of the Dawes Severalty Act 
which granted citizenship to allotted Indians did not cancel the restriction against 
alienation found in the preceding section of the same act. The two provisions, in other 
words, were not meant to be mutually exclusive. They felt that it was obvious that 
Congress had inserted the provisions intentionally for the “well-defined purpose” of 
protecting Indians from losing their lands. The provisions were not inconsistent, and 
could not logically be interpreted to mean otherwise. They were certain that the leases 
held by the Flournoy Company openly violated the laws of the United States and were
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therefore “utterly null and void.” The illegal settlers on the reservation were trespassers 
in the eyes o f the law.
The judges' ruling did not stop there, however. They went on to lambaste the 
Flournoy Company for what they felt was a shameful attempt to camouflage its sordid 
business behind a cloak o f legality. The judges believed that the Flournoy Company had 
obtained the leases with full understanding that the Dawes Act expressly prohibited such 
contracts. The Flournoy Company had deliberately violated the law believing that the 
federal government could not prevent them from doing so without bringing a multitude of 
suits for eviction. Furthermore, the judges thought it was fair to infer that the Flournoy 
Company believed that that course o f action would prove a “ . . .barren remedy, and that 
the law might be violated with impunity.” Finally, Thayer and Caldwell scolded the 
District Court of the State o f Nebraska for its role in confirming injunctions against 
Agent Beck to prevent him from evicting illegal lessees. They stated that Dundy, by 
aiding the land company in retaining possession of land acquired in open violation of 
federal law, had committed a gross injustice against Agent Beck, an officer o f the United 
States, acting under its orders. Attorney Ralph Breckenridge believed that the decision 
dealt the Flournoy Company their “death blow,” but warned that they might have some 
scheme in store to retain possession of the land while pending an appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court.4
Meanwhile back at the agency in Nebraska, John Beck, William Beck’s son and 
Acting Agent at the Agency while his father was in Saint Louis, reported that news of the 
decision did little to change things on the reservations. The Flournoy Company
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continued to conduct business as usual, leasing from Indians and sub-letting to whites. 
Members boasted that despite appellate court’s ruling, the matter was not yet finished. 
Company officials had intimated that an appeal to the United States Supreme Court could 
possibly delay the final decision for another two years. According to the acting agent, 
they snidely remarked that the Company had three months to file for a supersedeas, a 
court order which would temporarily prevent the execution of the existing court order
pending appeal. The Flournoy associates boasted that with their influence in Washington,
)
D. C., they would get it allowed. John Beck believed they were not entitled to a 
supersedeas, but at the same time, he recalled that his father had felt the same way about 
the original injunction.5 He thought it unlikely that the Company would be able to secure 
the supersedeas through Judges Caldwell or Thayer, but was unsure as to the disposition 
of Justice David J. Brewer in the matter.6 While Breckenridge was unaware of the extent 
o f the Company’s influence, he was certain that they would “ . . . leave no stone unturned 
to carry into effect their villanous [s/c] scheme.” Beck warned that should the Company 
be successful in obtaining a supersedeas, the Indians would likely give up and submit to 
the Company. Although the Indians realized they had been treated unfairly, they felt the 
little they had received from the Company during the period of unregulated leasing was 
better than the nothing they were getting during the injunctions, especially during the 
winter.8
The Flournoy Company, unfazed by Judge Thayer’s ruling, decided to take the 
offensive in the war against the agent. Beck reported that John Lemmon was circulating 
a petition among the Winnebagos calling for dissolution of the agency. He also heard
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rumors that the free-leasing advocates anticipated involving “state authorities” in the 
matter should the agency attempt to remove the Flournoy Company or its tenants from 
the reservations.9 Flournoy Attorney Harry C. Brome was already in Washington seeking 
a supersedeas. Breckenridge believed that Nebraska Congressmen John Meiklejohn was 
the source of the F lournoy Company's influence in Washington, D. C. in Breckenridge's 
view, Meiklejohn had been fooled by “continued and persistent misrepresentations” into 
believing that there was some substance to the Flournoy Company’s claims of injustice.10
Shortly after William Beck had returned to the Agency in late December, he 
eagerly set about making preparations to evict illegal occupants of reservation land. He 
posted a notice informing trespassers of the results of the Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision in Saint Louis, and instructing them to vacate the land or face summary 
eviction.11 The agent complained to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that his four 
Indian policemen were not sufficient to enforce the rules o f the Department on the 
reservation. In light o f the Flournoy Company’s “outrageous behavior” in response to the 
recent ruling, Beck considered “all legal means” to eject the company’s tenants 
exhausted. In order to enforce the law, the agent suggested that the time had finally come 
for troops to be used. He requested that the Commissioner arrange for the U.S. Army to 
dispatch a company of infantry or a troop of cavalry to the reservations immediately to 
aid in removing trespassers. Beck hoped the mere presence of the force would “serve all 
purposes.”12 Commissioner Daniel M. Browning, however, disagreed with the agent’s 
assessment and declined to send troops. He felt that only steps through the courts should 
be taken.13
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The Flournoy Company continued to resist Beck’s authority, published false 
statements in the local newspapers, and continued to make leases. On January 4, 1895, 
an article in the Pender newspaper, The Republic, announced that the Flournoy case had 
been appealed to the United States Supreme Court and, while it admitted that it was hard 
to tell when a decision would be made, it suggested that if the case took its “regular 
course” it would be “years.” Although authored anonymously, the writer was clearly in 
the camp of the free-leasing Penderites. Yet another piece announced that the Flournoy’s 
attorney, Brome, had successfully obtained a supersedeas in Washington, D. C. The 
article claimed that the supersedeas amounted “ . . .  to the same thing as a restoration of 
the injunction granted by Judge Dundy of Omaha.” The prose in last piece indicates that 
it was most likely propaganda written by William Peebles. The article claimed that the 
citizens of Pender and the “great majority” of the Thurston County hailed the news with 
delight. It also admitted that the reservations were the “principal contributor” to Pender’s 
prosperity and that if  Beck succeeded in removing the settlers, the land would revert back 
to a “tract of fertile but wild and nonproductive prairie.”14
Beck condemned the “false statements and scurrilous attacks” on the agency and 
himself, pointing to them as yet further examples of the “outrageous conduct” that 
members of the Pender Ring had lately resorted to. He dismissed Lemmon’s tirade as 
pure lies, and pointed out that Lemmon was generally known to be o f “bad character.” In 
response to the last article, Beck claimed that he had twice enough applicants waiting for 
land. Furthermore, the prospective lessees could afford to give bond and would not 
demoralize the Indians, unlike the current Flournoy lessees.15
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Despite the personal attacks and the allegations of wrongdoing at the agency, 
what most alarmed Beck was the news that Brome had secured a supersedeas in the case. 
If true, the court order would prevent him from taking action against the illegal lessees 
until the case was heard on appeal to the Supreme Court. The delay would mean another 
victory for the Flournoy Company and another blow to the Agent’s authority on the 
reservations. Beck made a special trip to the Western Union telegraph station in Dakota 
City, Nebraska on January 5, where he fired off a telegram to the Commissioner reporting 
the news and requesting the Commissioner verify whether it was true. If it was, Beck 
recommended that a motion to vacate the supersedeas be filed immediately.16 Two days 
later, Beck found out locally that a supersedeas had not been granted. Justice Brewer had 
only granted Brome an appeal to the Supreme Court. The agent was relieved, since an
• • 17appeal did not interfere with his ability to proceed with evictions. He discovered that
the announcement in the newspaper which stated that a supersedeas had been granted,
was nothing more than a Flournoy Company ploy meant to “mislead ignorant people”
into a false sense of security and reassurance. United States Attorney General Richard
Olney later confirmed that Justice Brewer had not granted a supersedeas, nor had Brome
1even applied for one. According to Brome, the appeal he secured gave the Flournoy 
Company “all the benefits” of a supersedeas.19 Although this was patently false, the 
advice was good enough for the Flournoy Company.
Beck was anxious to get the case heard before the Supreme Court as soon as 
possible. Even without a supersedeas officially preventing him from asserting his 
authority on the reservations, the Flournoy Company’s stubbornness and refusal to give
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up claim to the land blunted Beck’s push to evict the illegal settlers. Although he had 
applied for troops to facilitate the process, his superiors in Washington declined his 
request. Beck would have to make do with legal action in local courts and use of his 
small Indian police force to proceed with evictions. Since a supersedeas was not issued, 
Solicitor General Holmes Conrad directed Breckenridge to apply to a Circuit Judge for an 
order to execute the December 10 mandate of the Circuit Court o f Appeals. Conrad had 
already directed the Circuit Court of Appeals to grant the order. Apparently 
Breckenridge only need apply to the Appeals Court to get the order. With that 
accomplished, Conrad felt that “ . . . the case in its present condition . . [was] . . . not one 
o f such urgency . . . [nor] presented] questions of such public importance, as would 
justify the Department in asking for its advancement, or which the court, following its 
usual practice, would be likely to advance upon the docket.” In other words, the 
Solicitor General wanted the agent to secure a court order to enforce the decision against 
the Flournoy Company. However, since this would supposedly solve Beck’s problems 
with the Flournoy Company, the appealed case was not so urgent and therefore would 
have no reason to be booted up the list of cases to be heard by the Supreme Court any 
time in the near future.
Apparently the Solicitor General did not understand that Flournoy Company paid 
no attention to anything that was not state ordered. The Flournoy Company had the state 
courts in their pocket, and they had little reason to fear local government enforcement of 
the appellate court’s decision. Beck and his counsel needed to come up with another plan 
if  they were to stop the Flournoy Company. Breckenridge decided that their best chance
106
of success was in obtaining a broad injunction against the Flournoy Company. Although 
Conrad endorsed the idea, he suggested that if  the injunction did not work out, authority 
to use military force might be the next step. Conrad did not pretend to know under what 
circumstances Breckenridge would ask for the injunction, but he cautioned the attorney to 
take care that it not present the Flournoy Company with an opportunity to contest the 
injunction’s grounds. The Solicitor General was reluctant to use military force, but he 
feared that it was a remedy to which they might “ultimately be driven.”21 Beck went to 
Omaha at Breckenridge’s request, bringing with him a list of names o f illegal lessees and 
descriptions o f the land each held through illegal leases. Later, the two o f them went to 
Lincoln to consult with Andrew J. Sawyer, the district attorney, who suggested that the 
bill o f complaint include all illegal settlers on the both reservations. Back in Omaha, 
Breckenridge and Beck prepared the bill o f complaint seeking an injunction against the 
Flournoy Company and 265 individual settlers. Breckenridge planned to submit the bill 
o f complaint and request for injunction to the Circuit Court for the District o f Nebraska. 
Beck hoped that the injunction would prevent the Flournoy Company from receiving any 
further payments from its sub-lessees.22
In the meantime, Conrad contacted Breckenridge, inquiring whether he and Beck 
had considered the possible delay and expense that litigation under a separate bill against 
the trespassers would entail. Breckenridge admitted to Beck that this surprised him, since 
he was under the impression that the injunction was Conrad’s idea in the first place. 
Breckenridge telegraphed Conrad, explaining that he and Sawyer agreed that the expense 
of additional litigation would be much less than the cost of employing troops.
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Furthermore, in Beck’s opinion a “considerable number” of the illegal lessees named in 
the bill o f complaint were likely to cease resisting the agent once served with the writ. 
Even if  the injunction was not completely successful in releasing all the settlers from the 
Flournoy Company’s grip, it would still reduce the numbers o f illegal settlers on the 
reservations, and any military force eventually resorted to would be lessened 
proportionately. 24 If  enough settlers obeyed the injunction, it was quite possible that the 
U.S. Marshal could handle the remaining settlers for their contempt of court. Beck did 
not really care either way. He, no doubt, would have just as soon have preferred to use 
troops, but his instructions from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs insisted that he 
“exhaust all legal remedies before applying for troops.” Breckenridge added that he 
had not yet had the chance to file the bill o f complaint, but he planned on doing so that 
very day. While he was certain it was the most desirable action to take, he would hold 
off until he heard from Conrad.26
Although the mandate of the Appellate Court was handed down, nothing had 
come of it. Beck wondered whether an injunction against the Flournoy Company would 
be granted or if  troops were going to be sent. Although Beck had notified Flournoy 
Company tenants to vacate the land or lease through the agency, he reported that a large 
number o f them simply ignored his ultimatums. Flournoy Company spokesmen had 
convinced the settlers that the agent had no authority, so many of the tenants decided to 
pay their 1895 rents to the Company. The agent pointed out that if  something was not 
decided soon, the rents for 1895 would be completely lost to the Indians. Furthermore, 
the delay was reducing the chances of recovering land under the four remaining
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injunctions then in force against the agent.27 Beck was initially dismayed at 
Breckenridge’s decision to hold off on filing the injunction because the delay prevented 
settlers from using their subpoenas as an excuse not to make payments on notes held by
9 Qthe Flournoy Company.
Beck later found out that even had Breckenridge filed for the injunction 
immediately, Judge Elmer S. Dundy would not even look at the bill o f complaint. Not 
only did Dundy refuse to have anything to do with the injunction against the settlers, but 
he also refused to hear the other four injunction cases against Beck still pending in the 
Circuit Court for the District of Nebraska.29 The constant uphill struggle that 
Breckenridge faced to get legal matters attended to in the local state courts was beginning 
to wear on the attorney. Since Judge Dundy had refused to consider his application for 
an injunction, Breckenridge had little choice but to travel to Saint Paul, Minnesota, in the 
hopes that Judge Sanborn might. Sanborn, however, refused to issue a mandatory 
injunction unless each of the 265 defendants were notified and a hearing was made. A 
discouraged Breckenridge telegraphed Conrad to suggest that, under the present 
circumstances, military force was now preferable. To his astonishment, Conrad replied 
that he should apply for individual writs of possession and have the U.S. Marshal serve 
them. As Breckenridge was aware even if  Conrad was not, a writ o f possession was not 
applicable to their case. Judge Sanborn had refused to order the writs on those grounds. 
Breckenridge doubted that Conrad would opt to accept the delay and expense involved in
on
a hearing for the injunction. One of the few remaining options was use o f the military.
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Sanborn had grumbled to Breckenridge that he had suspected that Conrad had 
wanted to use military force all along, but was trying to dump the responsibility of 
directing its use onto the courts instead of shouldering the responsibility himself. 
Breckenridge warned Beck that when the agent made his requisition for troops to be 
careful not to use them to remove John B. Carey, B. T. Hull & Sons, E. J. Smith, and F. 
B. Hutchins and Sons. Their injunctions against Beck were still in effect and Dundy 
would likely slap Beck with contempt of court if he interfered with them. Sanborn 
refused to hear the injunction cases, but he arranged for a judge from Wyoming to hear 
them in Lincoln, Nebraska, on April 16. Breckenridge was satisfied with that
T1arrangement, since he felt that any judge but Dundy would do. The news was good 
enough for Beck to legitimately report that he had exhausted every legal means to 
dislodge the Flournoy Company from the reservation and he made another formal 
recommendation for the use of troops.32
The Department of the Interior was still not convinced that the military needed to 
get involved with the situation on the reservations. While Beck was awaiting a decision 
on his request, Sawyer had suggested increasing the Indian police force on the reservation 
to help with the evictions. Beck felt it worth a try and he formally requested permission 
to expand his police force by one captain and sixteen policemen. He made it clear that 
his latest request was in addition to, and not instead of, the request for military 
assistance.33
To Breckenridge’s surprise, Conrad had directed him to pursue the injunction 
through Sanborn, although it meant costly delays. Breckenridge filed for the injunction
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through the U.S. Cireuit Court for the District of Nebraska on March 21. Conrad later 
stated that he was always “decidedly adverse” to using troops, but was willing to do so if 
it was necessary. Judge Sanborn had given the defendants thirty days in which to reply to 
Breckenridge’s bill o f complaint and request for injunction. Sanborn arranged for the 
Wyoming judge, last name Riner, to hear the case in Omaha on April 22. Conrad stated 
that if  the injunction was awarded, he would direct the district attorney and the U.S. 
Marshal to employ all available means to enforce the injunction. If  the use of civil force 
was still found to be inadequate, however, he would consider military force.34
On March 22, 1895, the same day that Beck wrote the Commissioner requesting 
military support against the Flournoy settlers and the day after Breckenridge filed for an 
injunction in Saint Paul, James B. Sheean, of the law firm Smith and Sheean in Omaha, 
wrote Commissioner Browning, expressing interest on behalf of his client, the Flournoy 
Company, to arrange a settlement.35 Perhaps suspecting the game was nearly up, the 
Flournoy Company had decided to offer terms. Sheean forwarded copies of a formal 
proposal signed by John Lemmon and John Myers to the Commissioner o f Indian Affairs 
and the Secretary of the Interior. The proposal contained only two terms. First, the 
Flournoy Company agreed to surrender possession of the land in question on January 1, 
1896. They reserved the right to remove all buildings and improvements. Second, the 
Flournoy Company promised to end all litigation it currently held against the federal 
government. With agreement of the courts, the Company suggested that all legal 
proceedings currently pending would be suspended. The Company would be allowed to 
collect rent from its tenants, and in turn, would pay the Indians according to the terms of
I l l
its lease. This offer was actually quite absurd since the Company’s claim to the land was 
a pretended five-year lease with the four man Winnebago “council” in January 1891. 
The illegal lease under which they nonetheless continued to hold claim to the land was 
due to expire on January 1, 1896 anyway. The Flournoy Company had been seeking 
delay through the courts all along, and now that the end was nearly at hand they felt 
desperate enough to try anything. The Commissioner referred the proposition to Beck 
and left the decision up to him. Beck, who realized that Lemmon and Myers had tried to 
arrange a “truce” behind his back, flatly rejected the offer.36
News spread quickly that the judge from Wyoming was due to arrive in Omaha 
on April 22, to rule on Breckenridge’s request for the injunction against the Flournoy 
Company and the illegal settlers. Breckenridge reported that the illegal settlers 
understood that the United States intended to remove them from the reservations. He 
also advised Conrad that there had recently been some “friction upon the reservations” 
between a number o f illegal settlers and Beck. The attorney believed that the action had 
been largely fomented by the Flournoy Company and “other persons” interested in 
keeping the settlers on the land. While the whole matter had attracted a great deal of 
local attention, the illegal settlers and their supporters anticipated Judge Riner’s arrival 
with dread. Breckenridge suggested to Conrad that it might strengthen Beck’s authority 
among the illegal settlers if  word was leaked to the public that even if the injunction was 
denied, officials in Washington were determined to use the military to eject trespassers on
'Xn • . . .the reservation. Breckenridge suggested the same thing to Commissioner Daniel M.
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Browning, adding that if Judge Riner was aware that military force was going to be used 
if the civil process failed, he might be more inclined to grant the injunction.38
An article in the Omaha World-Herald quoted Breckenridge as saying that A. C. 
Abbott, ex-county judge of Thurston County, had told him that an organization of twenty 
men had planned to kill Beck if  they were forced off the reservation. Abbott reportedly
39described the group of men as determined to stay unless put off by military force. John 
Lemmon responded with a lengthy letter to the editor of the Pender Republican. 
Lemmon accused Breckenridge of making up the story about a group of men wanting to 
kill Beck in order to influence officials in Washington, D. C., to send the military. The 
letter warned that the Flournoy Company intended to stand by their tenants in the leasing 
dispute. Referring to the Agency as a “hotbed of rottenness,” and a “stench in the nostrils 
of honest men,” Lemmon warned the community that the situation was not only Beck 
against the Flournoy Company, but Beck against all of Thurston County, “every man, 
woman and child, both Indian and white.” Responding to Beck’s comment that he was a 
“damned anarchist,” Lemmon retaliated against the agent’s character, remarking that, “If 
this government has no better material out of which to make Indian agents, the sooner it 
goes out o f business the better.” Lemmon accused Beck of concocting “deceptive 
schemes” to swindle Flournoy renters, and claimed that only through “the presence of 
some force more powerful than civil officers of the law” could Beck enforce such 
“unlawful proceedings.”40
As Beck pointed out to the Commissioner, Lemmon published this and other 
similar “incendiary articles” like it for no other reason than to influence and confuse
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ignorant settlers of the real facts.41 Lemmon’s amateur propaganda, suggesting that his 
company’s problems were Thurston County’s problems, was a vain attempt to gain 
support and sympathy from the community and turn public opinion against Beck. His 
reference to the possible use of the military force to evict settlers indicates that he was 
aware it was being considered and also that he feared that if  it came to that, his company 
would no longer be able to resist the agent.
Although Breckenridge, Beck and Sawyer were in Omaha on April 22 to be 
present at the hearing for the injunction against the Flournoy Company and the illegal 
settlers, neither Judge Dundy nor Judge Riner were in town. Riner was still in Lincoln 
hearing the cases of the four injunction suits against Beck. The cases of Frank B. 
Hutchens, (trustee for Chittenden) and Ernest J. Smith were both dismissed, but the suits 
of B. T. Hull and Sons and John B. Carey had gone to court. The previous week 
Breckenridge had been in Lincoln, trying to get all four injunctions dismissed. 
Unfortunately, Judge Dundy was also there, and he announced in open court in the “most 
emphatic terms” that he disapproved of the government’s policy concerning the 
injunctions and he declared that he would not hear the cases “so long as there was another 
litigant in the court with a case ready to be heard.”42 The two judges finally agreed to 
hear the case on the April 26. The court heard arguments for several hours, during which 
time, Beck later complained to the Commissioner that Dundy “acted throughout as if  he 
were Counsel for the defendents [,sic\ .”43
Breckenridge was certain that Judge Dundy and Judge Riner disagreed on every 
point in the case but one. Consequently, the judges agreed to postpone the case until a
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later date, despite “as vigorous a protest against further delay” as either Sawyer or 
Breckenridge could make without being charged with contempt of court. Breckenridge 
stated that afterwards, Judge Riner had confided in him that they were entitled to the 
injunction, but he had to agree with Dundy on his point that an injunction should not be 
granted on ex parte affidavits alone. Breckenridge lamented the decision, since he 
realized that Riner would probably not be in town when the case came up again June 1, 
which would leave the case at the mercy of Dundy. The attorney complained to Conrad 
that he had “not the slightest doubt in the world that because of the sympathy of Judge 
Dundy with the opposition, the machinery of the court will be used to obstruct as long as 
possible any action which the United States may authorize taken.”44 Beck’s 
condemnation of Dundy was more succinct. The day after the hearing, the agent 
telegraphed Browning from Omaha, complaining that Judge Dundy had acted “ . . .  in 
accordance with the Counsel of the illegal lesses [sic\.,A5 Beck believed that any adverse 
decision made by Dundy in the case could quickly be reversed in the Appellate Court, but 
he complained that Dundy was well aware of that too, which is why he had been reluctant 
to hear the cases and when forced to, maneuvered to postpone his decision.46
Beck was convinced that the state courts were firmly committed to the Flournoy 
Company and the plight of the illegal settlers. He complained that the failure of the 
United States to secure justice through the courts had emboldened the trespassers and 
encouraged them to defy his authority on the reservations. Although his Indian police 
had evicted some settlers, many simply returned and threatened to resist being evicted a 
second time. Civilians, as well as county officials, had threatened the lives o f his Indian
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police. Beck understood that the Penderites had sworn in a “large number” of deputies 
and planned to arrest his Indian police. The agent was worried that his small, poorly 
armed Indian police force practically invited resistance. He felt that if  he had a sufficient 
number o f them, he could avoid trouble. While the agent clearly preferred to have a 
troop of cavalry sent to the reservations, he would settle for authorization to increase his 
police force. Beck felt it imperative to the dignity of the United States that the 
trespassers be removed from the reservations immediately.47
Although Secretary of the Interior Hoke Smith finally acquiesced to Beck’s 
request for troops, Acting Secretary of War Joseph B. Doe refused to authorize them, 
stating that “it is not thought that the facts warrant the use of troops as requested.” 
Instead, Doe suggested that Captain Beck be furnished with a “sufficient number” of
JQ
properly armed Indian police to evict the settlers. A few days later, Doe authorized the 
delivery of twenty Springfield rifles and ammunition to the agent to arm his Indian 
police.49 Upon Secretary Smith’s later request that War Department increase the number 
of rifles to seventy, Secretary of War Daniel S. Lamont amended the original order.50 
The Ordnance Office express shipped seventy .45 caliber, model 1884 Springfield rifles 
and 2,800 rifle ball cartridges from the Rock Island Arsenal to Beck to arm his 
substantially enlarged police force.51
Although the Circuit Court of Appeals had overturned Judge Dundy’s earlier 
ruling in favor of the Flournoy Company and had denounced the illegal settlers as 
trespassers, Agent Beck still faced stiff resistance in trying to clear the reservations. 
Sympathetic local courts continued to harass the agent at every opportunity. Bureaucratic
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red tape in Washington also proved to be the source of some perplexing obstacles. 
Meanwhile the advocates of free-leasing in Pender continued to spread rumors and 
propaganda designed to confuse settlers and alienate public opinion against the agent, 
attempting to undermine support from the community. Unable to remove the illegal 
settlers in the face of such steep opposition, and having eliminated every means through 
the courts to enforce the Appellate Court decision, Beck finally resorted to the use o f 
armed force. Although the War Department declined to send troops, it agreed to supply 
the agent with rifles and ammunition. What Beck did with them was yet to be seen.
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CHAPTER SIX
TALES OF WOE
“ . . . A public man rarely receives justice at the hands of a newspaper reporter. 
Unworthy men are very often exalted and praised by them, while worthy men have been 
beaten down and traduced.”1
William V. Allen 
U.S. Senator, Nebraska 
August 1, 1895
News that Agent William Beck had received authorization to enlarge his Indian 
police force and arm them with government rifles in order to evict Flournoy settlers 
alarmed Company officials and the free-leasing faction in Pender. Although they had 
been successful at keeping the agent at bay through their influence in the local courts and 
law enforcement agencies, a large armed force under the agent’s control was a serious 
threat to their interests. In early July 1895, Beck had begun to use his Indian police to 
evict the remaining Flournoy settlers from the Winnebago Reservation. What had often 
been analogized in the local newspapers as an ongoing “war” between the agent and 
“General” William Peebles, complete with battles won and lost, was moving closer to 
becoming the real thing.
The reaction of the Penderites to Beck’s latest move was swift. Many of the 
evicted settlers who could not or would not re-lease through the agency assembled in 
Pender and swore out complaints against the Indian police. Thurston County Sheriff 
John Mullin, reportedly with a “large number o f deputies,” proceeded to re-establish the 
evicted settlers on their land. When Indian police were encountered, the size of Mullin’s
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force apparently convinced the still outnumbered Indians to retreat to the agency and no 
confrontation occurred between the opposing armed forces. On July 9, 1895, Flournoy 
Attorney Harry C. Brome secured from Judge W. F. Norris in Ponca, Nebraska, an 
injunction prohibiting Beck and his men from evicting the Flournoy settlers from the 
Winnebago Reservation.3 The injunction specified that the settlers should remain on the 
land until January 1, 1896, precisely the day that many of the original Flournoy leases 
expired.4 Sheriff Mullin attempted to serve the injunction on Beck at the agency 
sometime on the 17th or 18th of July, but the agent was not there, having left for Sioux 
City, Iowa on agency business.5 Instead, Mullin read the injunction to Henry French and 
George Rice Hill, two members of Beck’s Indian police, and left a copy of the notice of 
injunction on Beck’s desk at the agency.6
On the evening of July 17, William E. Peebles and G. S. Harris arrived in Omaha 
to purchase guns and ammunition. The men meant to purchase 100 Winchester repeating 
rifles, 100 shotguns and ammunition ostensibly to arm, “special deputy sheriffs” that, 
according to Peebles at least, Sheriff Mullin had requested to assist enforcement o f the 
Norris injunction.7 However, George F. Phillips later swore in an affidavit that on July 
17, Peebles had solicited John Tucker and himself to sign a petition to purchase guns 
ostensibly for the purpose of supporting the sheriff in enforcing the injunction against 
Beck. Phillips claimed that he told Peebles that he already had a gun and did not need to 
buy another, to which Peebles reportedly inquired whether Phillips was willing to assist 
the sheriff. Phillips said that he would only if  Mullin specifically requested help and 
deputized him in accordance with the law. Peebles made no reply. Later that morning,
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Phillips saw Mullin and asked whether the sheriff intended to take on deputies to assist 
him. He was surprised to find out that Mullin had no knowledge of Peebles’ petition to
o
arm citizens as special deputies, nor did the sheriff feel he needed such help. Peebles 
apparently took it upon himself to organize an armed extralegal posse, fooling settlers by 
giving them the impression that his efforts were legitimate and on the behalf o f the 
sheriff.
Peebles explained to a newspaper reporter in Omaha that while the citizens of 
Pender were not “warlike” people, they did intend to see that Beck obeyed the law. He 
claimed that Beck had already received notice of the injunction but continued to evict 
settlers. The agent and his Indian police, Peebles dramatically alleged, treated the settlers 
roughly, handcuffing the men “like convicts” and hauling women and children in wagons 
to the edge of the reservation, where the settlers and their belongings were 
unceremoniously “dumped in a heap.”9 Ironically, in another interview, Peebles 
portrayed Beck as the leader o f a land ring willing to adopt “violent measures” to secure 
lucrative profits at the expense of innocent settlers. In yet another ironic twist, he 
claimed that although the people o f Pender had tried to settle the question of jurisdiction 
in a competent court, the agent had “begged the issue” and thwarted justice.10 This was 
only a taste o f the new propaganda campaign that he and the Pender faction embarked 
upon in their effort to discredit Beck and the agency administration.
Peebles complained that the businessmen of Pender were tired of the agent’s 
“lawlessness” and “proposed to see that justice was meted out.” He further reported that 
Sheriff Mullin supposedly intended to arrest any Indian police that violated the Norris
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injunction, and Peebles boasted that if  Beck or his Indian police resisted, “trouble o f a 
serious nature” would follow.11 After the reservations were “clear” o f the Indian police 
Mullin and his “special deputies” would arrest Beck as well. However, if  what George 
Phillips later reported was true, Peebles’ claims were nothing more than sensational 
propaganda. When asked about the possibility that the military might interfere, Peebles
dismissed the thought, confidently predicting that the War Department would “keep its
12hands o f f ’ the matter. His portrayal of innocent white citizens being roughly and
unlawfully treated by Indians was nothing more than propaganda aimed at bolstering
general support for the Pender faction in its struggle against the agent.
Regardless o f the dubious nature of Peebles’ actions, the following evening boxes
o f guns arrived in Pender, where dozens of excitable and curious townspeople had
gathered to see what was going on. Although rumors spread that Peebles had secured
150 Winchesters and 50 Marlin long range guns with 10,000 rounds o f ammunition,
Peebles himself later admitted that he only managed to acquire about 100 rifles o f two
11different makes and sizes, along with shotguns and only 5,000 rounds o f ammunition. 
Despite the arrival o f the weapons and the great excitement among interested settlers, 
Sheriff Mullin refused to deputize any of them.14
Peebles’ falsehoods were not limited to misrepresenting the plans and activities o f 
Sheriff Mullin. He apparently made up inflammatory stories about Beck as well. Peebles 
knew that the sheriff had planned to visit the agency on the 17th in order to serve Beck 
with the Norris injunction. An Omaha reporter quoted Peebles as having said that upon 
receiving the injunction, Beck had decided to ignore it and had continued to evict settlers
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from the reservations.15 Assuming the quote was accurate, Peebles must have made the 
comment on or before July 18, since he reportedly arrived in Omaha the night of the 17th. 
It is reasonable to assume that the reporter took the quote that night or the next day before 
the newspaper went to print. In either case, it was extremely unlikely that Peebles knew 
whether Mullin had successfully served the injunction or not by that time, much less how 
Beck may have responded to it. The agent, in fact, was not available when Mullin called, 
having traveled to Sioux City shortly after hearing of the Norris injunction to report the 
news to his superiors and request instructions of whether to obey it once it was served. 
Since Beck traveled straight from Sioux City to Ponca, Nebraska on the 19th, he did not 
come into physical possession of the injunction notice until his return to the agency on 
the 20th, at the earliest. In response to Beck’s earlier request that the Indian Bureau 
provide instructions on how to proceed in face of the injunction, the Commissioner told 
him to follow the district attorney’s instructions to obey the court order. Peebles charge 
that Beck had both received the injunction and had chosen to ignore it is clearly false, yet 
another example o f his unscrupulous character and devious scheming.
At the same time that Beck reported the news of the injunction, he informed his 
superiors in Washington, D. C., that Peebles had gone to Omaha to secure guns and 
ammunition to arm evicted Flournoy settlers.16 The agent admitted to a reporter for the 
Sioux City Tribune that the news did not come as a surprise to him. As he understood it, 
the group o f men who signed Peebles’ petition consisted largely of desperate men whom
1 7he had already evicted from the reservation. As a precaution, Beck requested the 
Commissioner o f Indian Affairs authorize troops to protect his Indian police from
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i  o  t
interference by the civilian authorities and the rumored “Pender posse.” The agent did 
not anticipate bloodshed, but warned that he would enforce the laws of the United States,
“no matter at what cost.”19 While the agent predicted that not one shot would be fired, he
20warned that even one shot would be as bad as 1,000 as far as the repercussions went.
Had the agent been aware o f Peebles’ latest statements, he may have been less optimistic
in his assessment of the situation. Commissioner o f Indian Affairs Daniel M.
Browning instructed Beck to direct the matter to District Attorney Andrew J. Sawyer.
Sawyer sent for a copy of the bill on which Judge Norris had granted the injunction and
in the meantime directed the agent to obey the order. The next day Beck left Sioux City
21for Ponca, Nebraska, where he hoped to see Judge Norris about the injunction.
In the meanwhile, the Omaha World-Herald quoted Sawyer as having compared 
Peebles with the infamous John Brown raid on Harper’s Ferry. The way the district 
attorney saw it, what the Penderites were doing was nothing short o f armed insurrection 
against the federal government.22 Peebles responded that such a comparison was not 
accurate, since John Brown sought to “accomplish a good object by unlawful means” and 
the citizens o f Pender sought only to sustain the law. Peebles also commented that 
Commissioner Browning was neither judge nor jury for Nebraska, nor was Beck the “lord 
high sheriff’ o f Thurston County. The citizens of Pender, he claimed, were simply 
enforcing the lawful order of local state court. The firearms were necessary should the 
Indian police violate the court order and continue to evict settlers from the reservation. 
He also took the opportunity in a letter to the editor to administer another dose o f his 
“poor settler” propaganda, suggesting that Beck should wait for the Supreme Court’s
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decision on the appeal, rather than push forward with evictions. Peebles slandered Beck, 
portraying the agent as determined to “make homeless a lot o f earth’s poor toilers” so that 
the agent’s own alleged land ring cronies could profit.23 The appearance of these 
accusations echoed the allegations in the apparently forged letters that had appeared in 
June.
Peebles’ rhetoric apparently had some effect upon the public. An anonymous 
letter to the editor o f the Omaha World-Herald called for the federal government to 
investigate Beck. The letter was openly sympathetic toward the settlers, claiming that 
nothing good could come from evicting the “250 families” so close to harvest time. 
Appealing to the readers’ sense of humanity, it warned that most o f the hard-working 
settlers would become paupers for the winter if  forced off the land without the chance to 
harvest the seasons’ crops. It also suggested that “something more” than a sense o f duty 
must have driven the agent to evict the settlers, and it implied that Beck’s “favorites” 
lurked behind the scenes, waiting to rush in an appropriate the settlers’ crops.24 Although 
it was possible that the piece was submitted by Peebles himself, the style was not as 
sensational or inflammatory as his typical writing, and the impression is o f someone 
responding to the existing propaganda, not creating it. It is evident that the writer o f this 
letter was acquainted with some o f the other accusations towards Beck floating around 
the community at the time, but the author was ignorant or overlooked several important 
facts. The figure o f 250 families is grossly exaggerated. The number of effected lessors 
at the time was less than forty. The writer also ignored the fact that all settlers had been 
given the opportunity to harvest their original crops, regardless o f whether they decided
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to leave the reservation or re-lease through the agency. In both cases, Beck had 
expressly warned the settlers not to plant next seasons’ crops until each had secured the 
land through the agency. Although not completely accurate, the anonymous letter to the 
editor indicates that Peebles propaganda campaign was having some impact on the 
community.
Discrediting the agent through the local newspapers was not enough. In order for 
Peebles’ and his associates’ plan to work, they needed to get Beck removed from his 
position as agent. To this end, the Pender gang worked covertly to subvert the 
Commissioner’s confidence in the agent. Although conclusive proof is lacking, there is 
little doubt that Peebles was behind the scheme to defame the agent. By inducing Indians 
to sign a petition to remove the agent, or in some cases simply forging their names to it, 
Peebles and his Pender gang hoped to undermine the Indian Office’s trust in their agent. 
In some instances, poorly forged letters were sent to the Commissioner or Secretary of 
the Interior, purporting to be from individual Indians, seeking to “blow the whistle” on 
Beck’s alleged mismanagement of the agency and the supposed criminal abuse of his 
power.25
One forged letter, purported to be from an Omaha Indian named “Siles Philips,” 
unfavorably criticized Beck’s administration, implicating the agent and his staff, namely 
one o f his clerks, Thomas Sloan, in illicit leasing practices. While the penmanship of the 
letter was reasonably good, the grammar and spelling were especially poor, almost as if 
the forger tried too hard to make it appear as though a semi-literate Indian had written 
it. Upon closer examination, however, Beck showed that there was no Omaha Indian
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named Siles Philips, though there was one by the name of Cyrus Phillips. Furthermore, 
Indian Inspector James McLaughlin interviewed Cyrus Phillips and allowed him to 
inspect the letter. Not only did Cyrus deny having written the letter, but his signature to 
an affidavit signed in the presence of McLaughlin did not match the signature on the
?o
forged letter. The Inspector concluded that the original letter was a forgery.
On another occasion, a similar letter supposedly written by Omaha Indian John H. 
Bear charged Beck with leasing Omaha land to speculators against the wishes o f the 
Indian owners. The letter implicated Thomas and John Ashford, the agency traders, 
agency clerk Thomas Sloan, Nick Fritz, C. J. O’Conner, Beck’s son-in-law Charles 
McKnight, and others as members of an illicit land ring operating out of the agency. In a 
sworn statement witnessed by Sloan, the real John H. Bear denied writing the letter. Of 
course, the fact the Sloan witnessed the signing of the affidavit by Bear is somewhat 
suspect since the forged letter implicated him. However, Bear’s handwriting on the 
affidavit does not match that purported to be his on the original letter, again suggesting 
forgery. The fact remains that someone wrote the letters. It is probable that both letters 
were forged by unknown parties associated with the Pender faction, most likely Peebles 
himself, or at least someone under his direction. Both letters were written with the intent 
to bring into question the agent’s integrity. Both letters where written in June, about the 
same time that similar accusations began to appear in local papers.
In another attempt to subvert the agent, Peebles managed to arrange for a 
delegation of Nebraska senators and congressmen to visit Thurston County on an 
unofficial “fact-finding” mission. The congressional entourage included Senators
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William V. Allen and John M. Thurston, and Representatives George D. Meiklejohn, W. 
E. Andrews and Jesse B. Strode. The ostensible purpose of the visit was to obtain the 
Omahas’ feelings regarding another allotment and to investigate the controversy and 
allegations concerning the management of the agency. Beck had returned from Ponca, 
Nebraska and Sawyer came up from Omaha to be present at the meetings. In Pender, a 
special committee o f twenty-two citizens was appointed to meet and escort the delegation 
during their stay.31 Peebles had plenty of opportunity to influence the congressmen, who 
arrived in Pender on Tuesday, the 23rd. Peebles put the delegation up in his hotel and, 
that evening, the congressmen heard complaints from a group of evicted settlers. The 
official stenographer o f the proceedings was absent from this initial meeting, however, 
and as a result no records of the discussion were made.
District Attorney Sawyer swore out a complaint against Peebles, George Harris,
John Myers, William Myers, George Myers, John Lemmon, W. S. Garrett and others
before Justice o f the Peace Ashley Londrosh, charging the men with “conspiring willfully
and unlawfully to oppose the government by force.” U. S. Deputy Marshal Henry
Boehme arrested Peebles and Myers on the Omaha Reservation the following day after a
*
luncheon with the congressional delegation on the lawn in front of the Indian school, but 
not before Peebles spoke briefly to the delegation. Lemmon and Harris, apparently not 
members o f the Pender committee, were absent from the luncheon and remained at large. 
The arrests reportedly came as a complete surprise.
It became evident to an eyewitness correspondent from the Bancroft Blade that 
the proceedings at the agency on the 24th were “all a farce” and that the meeting was
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“packed” with “would-be land speculators” from Pender. The reporter commented that 
Strode, Meiklejohn, and Thurston had clearly sided with Peebles, despite what he felt was 
their weak defense against the charges made by Beck at the meeting. The reporter’s 
version of the meeting concluded that the congressional delegation was “clearly 
prejudiced” against the agent from the beginning.34 A short article in the Blair Pilot 
announced that the congressmen would have been lucky to leave Pender without being 
drafted into “General” Peebles’ “army,” and suggested that the congressional visit was
o c
nothing more than a “smart ruse” to divert attention from the real issue. Indeed, Beck 
was certain that the whole investigation was nothing more than another attempt by 
Peebles to get an additional Omaha allotment and open the reservation to the “mercy of 
the rapacious land-pirates,” while causing further delays which would allow his 
associates to collect on notes. Delay here was crucial, since the payment o f notes was 
directly linked to the ability of the tenants to harvest and sell their crops.
After hearing the Omahas speak about allotment, the delegation proceeded to the 
Winnebago Reservation. Upon arrival they ate dinner and, at 9 o ’clock that evening, 
assembled at the Agency to hear more testimony. By that time, however, the Winnebago 
Indians who had assembled at the agency earlier that day in anticipation of the meeting 
had since returned home. According to Beck, the subject of Indian legislation “was only 
touched upon so far as it related to the interest of the white settler.” Nineteen settlers 
testified that day, claiming in some way or another to be victims of blackmail by an 
agency sponsored land syndicate. Although several men associated with the agency were 
implicated, no one directly linked Beck to the alleged corruption. The citizens’
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committee o f Pender and the congressional delegation left the Winnebago Agency late 
that evening with plans to reassemble the following evening at the opera house in 
Pender.38
Taken at face value, the allegations of the nineteen men certainly appear to be the 
most damning evidence questioning Beck's administration at the agency. Upon closer 
investigation, however, the claims of corruption and impropriety are suspect at best. The 
nineteen men on record complaining o f extortion and blackmail were the exact same men 
who Inspector McLaughlin had interviewed earlier that summer and who he concluded 
were liars. Beck had described them as falling under the category of “desperate men” 
that could either not afford a formal lease under the agency restrictions or were of such 
character that he or the Indian allottee simply refused to lease to them. Beck explained 
that as agent, he was the sole arbiter of whether a potential settler’s presence on the 
reservation qualified as a positive influence and a desirable role model for the Indians. In 
many cases, the Indians themselves refused to transact business with the interested party
.  'XQbecause of previous experiences with ill treatment, unfair dealings or bad reputations.
The testimony of the Flournoy witnesses is unreliable, inconsistent, and otherwise 
suspect. O f the individuals whom the witnesses testified as having been involved in 
corruption at the agency, only Beck and Thomas Ashford, the agency trader, were present 
to defend themselves. Collectively, their accusations only implied the agent’s 
involvement by simple association. Not a single accuser directly implicated Beck to any 
wrongdoing, but simply assumed the agent was behind the graft because of his position 
as agent. Beck described Ashford’s “opportunity” to speak in on his own behalf
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as agent. Beck described Ashford’s “opportunity” to speak in on his own behalf 
concerning the allegations as more of a “prosecution” by the Congressmen, than the 
behavior o f an impartial investigation.
The individual allegations of agency corruption, furthermore, were noticeably 
similar in substance. The same small group of men, with a few exceptions, were 
implicated, although only one of them, Ashford, was present to defend himself against 
the allegations that evening. Beck complained that the tone of Thurston’s voice was that 
o f someone “interrogating a criminal” rather than the questioning of an impartial inquiry. 
Although Beck’s son John was among those implicated earlier by the complainants, and 
his name was reportedly on the list the delegates had acquired the night o f the 23rd, both 
Allen and Meiklejohn denied that John’s name had appeared on the list. These men 
claimed that it had been a mistake and that at no time had John been implicated. The 
congressmen only admitted this, however, after they had found out that John Beck was 
present that evening and was willing to defend himself against the allegations. Although 
the delegation denied John was on the list that night, later when the list appeared in the 
newspaper, his name inexplicably headed the list.40 Beck believed that although the 
ostensible reason for the congressional visit was to obtain information for future Indian 
legislation, the real reason was to investigate the agency’s alleged corruption, as 
intimated by the Pender faction 41
It was obvious to Beck that the Congressional delegation had been fed additional 
information ahead of time, most likely the first night they arrived in Pender at the town 
meeting. What transpired the night of that initial meeting, which various persons alluded
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reporter, despite the congressmen’s assurances that comprehensive and inclusive 
transcripts were going to be made of the entire visit. There is no record of what occurred 
during this initial meeting in Pender. When viewed in context o f the larger picture, the 
allegations of agency corruption appear for what they really were, a concocted plot on the 
behalf o f the Pender Ring and Peebles to cast a pall over the impeccable administration of 
Agent Beck. The accusations came as only the last in a long line of attempts by the 
Penderites to slow or reverse the tide of Beck’s late legal successes against their interests 
and that o f the land syndicates.
By stirring up sympathy in the congressman for the so-called “plight” o f what 
they represented as poor, innocent settlers, the Pender land ring was really looking out for 
its own selfish interests. The reason behind the ploy was not lost on Beck. He was aware 
that John F. Myers, the company’s treasurer, had earlier sent notifications to regional 
grain elevators and lumber companies, warning those businesses not to buy crops from 
Flournoy tenants. The notification listed the names of the tenants as well as the amounts 
owed to the Flournoy Company on notes for rents due at the end o f 1895. Thirty-three 
of the seventy-two tenants on the Flournoy Company’s blacklist had since re-leased 
legally through the agency. The liens held by the Company on those individuals’ crops 
and improvements amounted to $8,451.00, slightly over half o f the total $16,524.94 the 
Company had hoped to collect from its sublessees for the 1895 crop season.42 The 
Flournoy syndicate and others interested parties held bank notes in the form of liens on 
the settlers’ crops. The agent was well aware that the notes held by the local banks and 
land companies were tied to the settlers’ ability to harvest their season’s crops.
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The congressional committee had been strongly influenced from the beginning 
and despite its claims at impartiality, was predisposed very early against the agency and 
its position in the matter concerning the settlers. The transcripts of the meetings seem to 
bear out Beck’s impression as the bulk of time was spent investigating leasing issues and 
comparatively little time was spent on matters concerning the Indians. Beck’s version of 
events that transpired during the informal congressional investigation as reported to his 
superiors in Washington was completely substantiated by the official transcripts 
published months after the event.43 District Attorney Sawyer, who was present and 
witnessed the entire meeting, later commented that Beck had handled himself admirably, 
despite what the yellow press had spuriously labeled Beck’s “Ire.” To suggest that the 
sensational newspaper renditions of the event were wholly or in part embellished would 
be a monumental understatement.44 Beck consistently told the truth, while many local 
newspapers knowingly or unwittingly reported false and sensationalized versions of the 
events, having obtained their information from heavily biased sources and those seeking 
to discredit the agency.
The ploy of the Penderites had the desired effect. While in Pender on July 25, the 
congressional delegation telegraphed Hoke Smith in Washington urging the Secretary of 
the Interior to suspend the evictions. They argued that the evictions were causing 
tremendous loss of crops to “innocent” settlers.45 Acting Secretary John M. Reynolds 
replied the same day, stating that the Department was well aware of the situation and 
stood behind the agent in his actions, which he further pointed out were in accord with 
the decision of the Courts. Reynolds suggested that the congressional delegation advise
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stood behind the agent in his actions, which he further pointed out were in accord with 
the decision of the Courts. Reynolds suggested that the congressional delegation advise 
the settlers to take leases under the Department regulations.46 Not satisfied with 
Reynolds’ decision, Senator Allen shot back to the acting secretary, labeling the evictions 
as “moral crimes” and insisting that “considerations of humanity and justice” demand a 
halt to the evictions.47 Senator Thurston also telegraphed Reynolds, calling the evictions 
an “act o f barbarism not to be tolerated under free government,” and referred him to the 
letter in which their concerns were described at length. Thurston demanded that the 
Interior Department officially investigate the agency immediately.48 The senator later 
followed up his relatively brief telegram with a lengthy letter in which he explained that 
the delegation was not concerned with the Flournoy Companies’ legal battle against the 
Government, but rather the plight of the innocent settlers. Allegations o f corruption 
within the Indian agency, he felt, should not be ignored.49 Thurston was certain that a 
thorough and impartial investigation of the agency would change the views of the 
Department on the matter.50
Rather than reply to Reynolds, Congressmen Meiklejohn went to the papers. The 
congressman complained to a reporter for the Omaha World-Herald that Reynolds’ 
action in the matter concerning the evictions was a breach of etiquette and that the Acting 
Secretary should have waited until he received the delegates’ letter before responding. 
He also admitted that the congressional delegation had been surprised to find out the 
department was aware of what was going on and even more so that they continued to 
endorse Beck’s involvement regardless. The degree to which the congressional delegates
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had been completely misled by their visit is indicated by Meiklejohn’s statement in which 
he expressed his concern that, “ the settlers ought to be protected in their possession of 
the crops as innocent holders o f the leases, regardless o f their legality.” If  the 
Department did not conduct an official investigation into the agent’s apparent reckless 
handling o f affairs, he vowed, then Congress would.51
A less-restrained editorial in the Omaha World-Herald complained that the 
settlers had become “shuttlecocks in the game played between the Beck and anti-Beck 
factions.” The article portrayed Beck as a hot-headed and passionate man who could not 
be trusted to run the agency. It also attacked Reynolds and called his reply to the 
congressional delegates hasty and discourteous and accused him of having a “mad desire” 
to support the agent, “right or wrong.”52 Amid the flurry of misled accusations and cries 
o f injustice, Beck flatly denied the reports in the local newspapers o f his alleged 
discourtesy to the congressmen. The official transcripts, compiled by the stenographer 
employed by the delegation to record the meetings, later substantiated Beck’s claim. 
Although during one incident, when provoked by John Myers, Beck did seem to become 
noticeably excited, the agent never directed his anger to the congressmen, although the
53newspaper stories later completely misrepresented the event.
Beck later wrote to Senator Allen regarding an exceptionally inflammatory article 
in the Sioux City Journal, and requested that the senator, who knew the truth of the 
matter, publicly set the record straight.54 Although the agent was impressed by the 
senator’s conciliatory tone in what appeared to be a heartfelt letter, he remained 
disappointed by Allen’s staunch refusal to officially repudiate the story. Allen explained
138
to Beck that it would be better to just let the matter go, rather than to draw further 
attention to it.55 Beck believed that the Sioux City Journal had obtained the story from its 
correspondent in Pender. He was confident that the correspondent was the same source 
that supplied the dispatch to the Omaha World-Herald earlier. The agent’s ultimate 
vindication in the matter had to wait several months until after the actual transcripts 
recorded during the alleged event were finally transcribed and printed for the record.56
The congressional delegation met in conference the morning of the 25 and 
agreed to submit a telegram to Secretary of the Interior Hoke Smith. They requested that 
he suspend approval of any further leases made by the agent and “in the interests of 
justice,” to order the agent to cease in prosecuting any further evictions. Their request 
seemed absurdly redundant, since Beck had already ceased with evictions on the advice 
of the District Attorney, to whom the Commissioner had already directed Beck to obey 
concerning the injunction. Apparently, the Pender committee had convinced the 
congressmen that Beck had already ignored the injunction and continued to evict settlers, 
which was false. Nevertheless, acting on the Pender committee’s version o f events, the 
delegation concluded that the evictions constituted “rank injustice” to what was 
represented as a large number o f honest and hard-working citizens who earnestly felt that 
their leases were valid. Apparently unaware or unconcerned with the agent’s numerous 
and repeated warnings to the illegal settlers regarding leasing, the congressmen felt it was 
wrong that the government failed to evict the settlers until after their crops were planted 
and “practically matured.” Again, the Pender faction completely misrepresented the true 
situation. By selectively omitting critical aspects of the controversy, namely that the
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situation in an equitable manner. They insisted that the government must give the settlers 
an opportunity to remove their crops, unaware that the government had already done so 
and all but the most desperate settlers had satisfactory re-leased through the agent. 
Finally, the testimony heard by the congressmen alarmed their “high sense of public 
duty,” towards the settlers who had won their sympathies. The delegation urged an 
“immediate and searching” investigation into the administration of the Omaha and 
Winnebago Agency.
At no time before the congressional delegation’s visit to Thurston County had 
there been a single accusation involving an agency-sponsored land ring operating on the 
reservation. The confrontation between Beck and the “free-leasing” faction in Pender 
had hitherto been fought out in local and regional courts. The Penderites had rested their 
tenuous legal case against the assertion o f federal jurisdiction over the reservation solely 
on contorted and self-serving legal interpretations o f the citizenship clause o f the Dawes 
Act. Exerting strong social and political ties in the community, they tied the matter up in 
sympathetic state courts, where a series o f excessive and arguably calculated delays 
worked toward their advantage. When the case could no longer be reasonably delayed, 
the Pender faction exerted their influence to secure an ultimately favorable decision from 
Judge Dundy. Although Beck and his legal team immediately appealed the decision, the 
process entailed six further months o f delay. Once higher federal courts backed Beck’s 
claim to jurisdiction, it appeared to the land syndicates and other speculators that they 
would be forced to acquiesce. The Penderites, however, still had another trick up their
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sleeve. To that end, the Penderites embarked upon a devious scheme to traduce and 
denigrate the agent with hopes of securing his removal.
Only during the weeks following the Circuit Court o f Appeals decision, which 
flatly denied the legality o f the Flournoy Company leases and completely reversed 
Dundy’s erroneous decision on several counts, did the Penderites resort to alternative 
tactics. The Flournoy Company had failed to secure a supersedeas in their appeal to the 
Supreme Court. The failure to obtain a supersedeas precluded the possibility of an 
extension of the injunction against the agent during the interim until the appeal on the 
case was heard. The federal courts had confirmed the agent’s jurisdiction and authority 
once already and few men in the know at Pender were not so naive as to think the 
Supreme Court would overturn that decision in their favor. Worse yet for the die-hard 
advocates o f free-leasing, Beck’s claim to authority over the reservation lands was 
substantially bolstered by the enlargement o f his Indian police force. If  Beck insisted on 
disrupting their crime against the Indians, perhaps it was time to take their chances with 
another, less scrupulous agent. It is likely that Peebles and his associates in the Pender 
land ring masterminded an entirely different approach to secure the ends favorable to 
their interests.
141
NOTES
I William V. Allen to William H. Beck, August 1, 1895. Special Case 191. Boxes 
299-302, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D. C. FSC19T1.
Annotated newspaper clipping, “The Reservation Situation,” West Point 
Republican. July 26, 1895. SC191.
3 “Ewing Held for Trial,” Omaha World-Herald. July 23, 1895; Newspaper 
clipping, “Reviewing the Trouble,” West Point Republican. July 26, 1895, in SC191.
4 “Settlers’ Secret Mission,” Omaha World-Herald. July 19, 1895.
5 Unidentified newspaper clipping, probably The Pender Times or The Pender 
Republican, July 18, 1895, SC191.
6 “Settlers’ Secret Mission,” Omaha World-Herald. July 19, 1895.
7 “He Comes To Buy Firearms,” Omaha World-Herald. July 18, 1895.
8 Affidavit o f George F. Phillips, August 26, 1895, SC191.
9 Unidentified newspaper clipping, July 18, 1895, SC191.
10 “He Comes To Buy Firearms,” Omaha World-Herald. July 18, 1895.
II Ibid.
12 Unidentified newspaper clipping, July 18, 1895, SC191.
1 ^ Newspaper clipping, “Arms Arrive at Pender,” The Sioux City Journal. July 19, 
1895. SC191.
14 Hand written annotation by William Beck on newspaper clipping, “The 
Reservation Situation,” West Point Republican. July 26, 1895, SC191.
15 “He Comes To Buy Firearms,” Omaha World-Herald. July 18, 1895.
16 Telegram, William H. Beck to Commissioner D. M. Browning, July 18, 1895.
SC191.
142
17 Untitled newspaper clipping, The Sioux City Tribune. July 18, 1895, Vol XI, 
No. 2 5 1 .SC191.
18 Telegram, William H. Beck to Commissioner D. M. Browning, July 18, 1895.
SC191.
19 Untitled newspaper clipping, The Sioux City Tribune. July 18, 1895, Vol XI, 
No. 251, in SC191.
20 “Arms Arrive at Pender,” The Sioux City Journal, July 19,1895. SC 191.
21 William H. Beck to Commissioner D. M. Browning, July 19, 1895. SC191. 
“Beck Calls On Judge Norris,” Omaha World-Herald, July 20, 1895.
22 “War On the Government,” Omaha World-Herald. July 20, 1895.
23 “Mr. Peebles Makes Answer,” Omaha World-Herald. July 22, 1895.
24 “Time to Call Beck Down,” Omaha World-Herald. July 22, 1895.
25 William H. Beck to Commissioner D. M. Browning, June 26, 1895. SC191.
26 Siles Philips to Secretary o f the Interior Hoke Smith, June 10, 1895 (apparent 
forgery). SC191. #26791-95, enclosure #3.
27 William H. Beck to Commissioner D. M. Browning, June 26, 1895. SC191. 
#26791-95.
28 Affidavit o f Cyrus Phillips, witnessed by Inspector James McLaughlin, June 26, 
1895. SC191. #26791-95, enclosure #2.
29 William H. Beck to Commissioner D. M. Browning, July 16, 1895. SC191. 
#30039-95. John H. Bear to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, June 29, 1895 (apparent 
forgery). SC191: Affidavit of John H. Bear, July 15, 1895. SC191.
30 William H. Beck to Commissioner D. M. Browning, July 19, 1895. SC191.
31 “Ewing Held for Trial,” Omaha World-Herald. July 23, 1895.
32 Newspaper clipping, “The Agency Trouble,” The Bancroft Blade. July 26,
1895, SC191: Newspaper clipping, “The Reservation Situation,” West Point Republican. 
July 26, 1895. SC191.
143
33 “Peebles A Prisoner,” Omaha World-Herald, July 25, 1895.
34 “The Agency Trouble,” The Bancroft Blade, July 26, 1895 in SC191. 
Newspaper clipping annotated by William Beck.
35 Untitled newspaper clipping from The Pilot. Blair, Washington County, 
Nebraska, July 25, 1895, in SC191. William Beck penciled a comment in the margin, 
stating that he felt the article was the “gist” o f the whole affair.
36 William H. Beck to Commissioner D. M. Browning, July 31, 1895. SC191. 
#32564-95.
37 William H. Beck to Commissioner D. M. Browning, July 31, 1895. SC191. 
#32564-95.
38 “Beck’s Ire,” Omaha World-Herald. July 25, 1895.
39 U.S. Indian Inspector James McLaughlin to Secretary o f the Interior Hoke 
Smith, October 4, 1895. SC191 [McLaughlin Reportl; Exhibit 38, McLaughlin Report. 
“List o f the 19 sub-lessees who appeared before the Congressional Delegation at Pender 
July 23rd, 24th, & 25th, 1895 and reasons o f Agent not leasing to them,” September 30, 
1895. SC191.
40 William H. Beck to Commissioner D. M. Browning, July 31, 1895. SC191. 
#32564-95.
41 William H. Beck to Commissioner D. M. Browning, July 27, 1895. SC191. 
#31710-95.
42 John F. Myers to Holmquist Grain and Lumber Company o f Pender, August 1, 
1895. SC191: William H. Beck to Commissioner D. M. Browning, August 12, 1895. 
SC191.
43 William H. Beck to Commissioner D. M. Browning, July 31, 1895. SC191. 
#32564-95; Telegram, William H. Beck to Commissioner D. M. Browning, July 27,
1895. SC191. #31354-95; William H. Beck to Commissioner D. M. Browning, July 27, 
1895. SC191. #31710-95; U.S. Congress, Senate, “Transcripts o f the Proceedings Had 
Before Senators William V. Allen and John M. Thurston and Congressmen George D. 
Meiklejohn, W.E. Andrews, and Jesse B. Strode, Members of the Nebraska Delegation in 
the Fifty-Fourth Congress of the United States, Sitting as a Body at the Omaha and 
Winnebago Reservations and at Pender, Thurston County, Nebr., on the 24th and 25th 
Days o f July, A.D. 1895, for the Purpose of Inquiring into the Condition of Affairs on
144
Said Reservations.” S.Doc. 79. 54th Cong., 1st sess., 1896. Serial set 3349, [Transcripts o f 
the Proceedings], 39-40.
44 “Beck’s Ire,” Omaha World-Herald  ^July 25, 1895; “Every Inch a Soldier!,” 
Omaha World-Herald. July 26, 1895.
45 Telegram, William Allen, John Thurston, George Mieklejohn, W.E. Andrews 
and J.B. Strode to Secretary of the Interior Hoke Smith, July 25, 1895. SC191.
46 Telegram, Acting Secretary of the Interior John M. Reynolds to William Allen, 
John Thurston, George Mieklejohn, W.E. Andrews and J.B. Strode, July 25, 1895.
SC191: “Beck’s Course Approved,” Omaha World-Herald. July 27, 1895.
47 Telegram, William V. Allen to Acting Secretary of the Interior John M. 
Reynolds, July 27, 1895. SC191.
A O
Telegram, John M. Thurston to Acting Secretary of the Interior John M. 
Reynolds, July 26, 1895. SC191.
49 William V. Allen to Acting Secretary of the Interior John M. Reynolds, July 29,
1895. SC191: John M. Thurston to Acting Secretary of the Interior John M. Reynolds, 
July 27, 1895. SC191. #31883-95; Telegram, George D. Meklejohn to Acting Secretary 
of the Interior John M. Reynolds, July 29, 1895, SC191. #32936-95; “Thurston Is In 
Earnest,” Omaha World-Herald. July 29, 1895; “Tweedledee, Tweedledum: Senator 
Allen so Regards the Fight Between the Flournoy Company and Its Enemies,” Omaha 
World-Herald. July 30, 1895; W. E. Andrews to Acting Secretary of the Interior John M. 
Reynolds, July 31, 1895, SC191. #32960-95.
50 John M. Thurston to Acting Secretary of the Interior John M. Reynolds, July 
27, 1895. SC191. #31883-95.
51 “Surprised: Congressmen Meiklejohn Talks Plainly on the Upholding of 
Captain Beck,” Omaha World-Herald. July 27, 1895.
52 “A Serious Situation,” Omaha World-Herald. July 31, 1895.
53 “Beck’s Ire,” Omaha World-Herald. July 25, 1895;.William H. Beck to 
Commissioner D. M. Browning, July 31, 1895. SC191. #32564-95.
54 William H. Beck to Senator William V. Allen, July 26, 1895. SC191.
55 William V. Allen to William H. Beck, August 1, 1895. SC191.
145
56 Transcripts of the Proceedings, 39-40
57 William V. Allen, John M. Thurston, W. E. Andrews, J. B. Strode and G. 
Meiklejohn to Secretary of the Interior Hoke Smith, July 25, 1895. SC191: 
“Congressmen Act Quickly,” Omaha World-Herald. July 26, 1895.
CHAPTER SEVEN
GIVING UP THE GHOST
“I am informed that the entire sentiment of the antagonistic element in the Pender district 
seems to have under gone a change.”1
William H. Beck
Omaha and Winnebago Indian Agent 
October 13, 1895
The injunction suits filed by B. T. Hull and Sons and Robert Pilgrim, et. al,
(
effectively prevented Agent William H. Beck from evicting illegal tenants of land 
included in those suits, despite the ruling of the Circuit Court o f Appeals in December of 
1894. While Special Assistant U.S. District Attorney Ralph W. Breckenridge had, at 
Beck’s direction, filed for counter-injunctions hoping to prevent the land companies from 
collecting rent, none of the U. S. District Court judges for Nebraska would hear the cases. 
Judges Amos Thayer and Walter S. Sanborn were both too busy themselves to take up the 
demurrers. Instead, they arranged to have the cases heard by Judge O. P. Shiras in the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa in Dubuque on August 23. 
Breckenridge ensured Beck that the arrangement was “entirely satisfactory” with him, 
since he was personally acquainted with Shiras and felt confident that he would not be 
“ . . . influenced by conditions other than those presented by the facts. . .” A couple of 
weeks later, Judge Shiras had made up his mind and on Tuesday, October 8, handed 
down his decision in the case of Robert Pilgrim et a l vs, Beck, Shiras found in favor of 
Beck and dissolved the injunction protecting land covered by Robert Pilgrim’s restraining 
order.3
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Finally clear of legal entanglements, Beck and his Indian police wasted no time in 
resuming the eviction of the remaining illegal settlers hitherto covered by the now 
defunct injunction. Within the week, sixteen illegal lessees had been officially evicted. 
Twelve of those, with no remaining legal recourse, chose to arrange leases through the 
agency and were permitted to return to farms. Beck expected the remaining four to do so 
soon thereafter.
Not every attempt to evict went as smoothly. On October 10, a band of eight 
armed white men from Pender, including John F. Myers and W. S. Garrett, confronted 
and drove away a group of six Indian police who were guarding the farm of a recently 
evicted illegal settler. Following Beck’s implicit instructions to avoid situations that 
might instigate violence, the Indian police retreated to the agency to report the incident 
and seek additional orders. In response, Beck instructed the detachment o f Indian police 
to return and retake possession o f the farm. This time they were to arrest any person who 
attempted to interfere. Anticipating trouble, Beck later sent a second group of Indian 
police to reinforce the previous group. The Indian police managed to arrest Myers and 
Garrett, returning the trespassers to the agency where Beck had them arraigned before 
magistrate. The two men were charged with several counts o f violation o f the law and 
jailed. After posting bond of five hundred dollars each, the men were released and their 
trials scheduled for later that month.4
In the days that followed, rumors quickly spread that John S. Lemmon, president 
o f the Flournoy Company, had informed his former sub-lessees that he was “done” and 
would not offer up any more resistance against the agent. Beck triumphantly reported to 
his superiors in Washington, D. C., that he viewed Myers’ attempt to intimidate his police
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as a “last effort” on the part o f the Flournoy Company to interfere with the evictions. 
Furthermore, the agent was eager to report that the “antagonistic element” in Pender had 
finally cooled as well.5
Both Myers’ and Garrett’s cases, as well as an earlier pending case against Sheriff 
Mullin, were heard by Judge Shiras. The exact set of charges in each o f the cases varied, 
but they notably held in common the charge of obstructing a government officer in the 
performance of his duty. On October 28, Shiras rendered his view that Beck and his 
Indian police had acted within the confines of their federally authorized jurisdiction on 
the reservations. The actions of Sheriff Mullins, as well as the subsequent actions of 
Myers and Garrett, the judge decreed, constituted interference and was, therefore, illegal. 
Breckenridge telegraphed news of the decision to Beck, who was at the time on a leave of 
absence in Fort McPherson, Georgia. He reported that Shiras, having agreed with him 
“on nearly all points,” had sustained the indictments against Mullin and denied Myers’ 
and Garrett’s writs o f habeas corpus. Beck understood that the judge’s recent decision 
sustained his own position in the use of his Indian police. Excited to have the question 
over his authority and jurisdiction on the reservation finally settled, Beck informed the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs that he would cut his vacation short and return to the 
agency immediately.6
Judge Shiras, whose court sat comfortably removed from local politics and public 
opinion of northeastern Nebraska, was not encumbered by political considerations or 
influenced by social ties with the community. He was the break that Beck and his legal 
team had needed so badly all along, a truly unbiased judge who considered nothing but 
the true intent and spirit of the law.
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was the premise on which the Company justified its direct dealings with the Indians. 
Their self-serving interpretation served them well not only to defraud the Indians, but 
also to delay the government’s reaction to its own, short-sighted policy.
Due to the unwavering determination of Agent Beck in his persistent efforts and 
staunch idealism to defend the best interests of the Indians under his charge, the delay 
tactics o f the Flournoy Company and their Penderite supporters had begun to crumble. 
Despite his ultimate vindication, however, Beck’s victory against the Pender ring was 
bittersweet. Although the Flournoy Company finally acquiesced in October 1895, this 
was short by only two months of the natural expiration of its original leases with the 
Indians, which were set to expire on January 1, 1896. The Company, though forced to 
give up the ghost in the end, had managed to bilk the Indians out o f the benefit of their 
land for the better part of the proceeding five years.
While the apparent capitulation of the Flournoy Company was a major victory for 
Beck in his crusade against illegal leasing, the war was not over. The injunction held by 
B. T. Hull and Sons, as well as others, remained in force. Although Breckenridge had 
sought to have the case involving that injunction heard since the previous May, Judge 
Elmer S. Dundy had continued to vacillate. By now, however, Breckenridge realized 
there was a much more favorable and expedient option available. If  Dundy would not 
hear the case, perhaps he would consent to transfer the case to Judge Shiras. When 
Breckenridge approached the judge with the idea, Dundy appeared only too happy to 
wash his hands of the whole affair, and readily granted the request.9
Some evicted settlers were more tenacious than others. On October 26, Beck’s 
Indian police evicted Oliver E. Anderson from the reservation for refusing to re-lease
151
legally Indian land which Anderson insisted was his under an earlier, illegal lease. 
Despite the eviction, Anderson subsequently returned to the reservation. On November 
12, he applied for, and received from Judge W. F. Norris, Eighth Judicial District for 
Nebraska, an injunction against Beck and several members of his Indian police. When 
Beck received notification o f the order on the morning o f the fourteenth, he was 
dumbfounded. The restraining order directed him to present himself at the Cuming
tilCounty Court House in West Point, Nebraska, at two o ’clock the afternoon on 25 of that 
month. In addition, the order forbade Beck, or anyone acting under his authority, from 
interfering with Anderson’s possession of the land in question until that time.10
Exasperated, Beck telegraphed District Attorney Andrew J. Sawyer in Omaha. In 
light o f recent decisions made by the U.S. Circuit Court in the cases of Myers and 
Garrett, Beck did not understand how Judge Norris could issue such an order. Beck was 
certain the judge had no jurisdiction and he felt that Judge Norris knew this as well. 
Furthermore, by aiding violators of the law, he accused Norris of being “particeps 
Criminis” in the matter. The agent’s immediate concern, however, was whether he 
should obey the injunction. He wanted to know if  anything could be done to prevent 
Judge Norris from “violating the U. S. law and outraging the Executive Office of the 
Government” by granting such injunctions. Referring to section 3703 of Lawsons 
Remedies and Procedures, Vol 7., Beck understood that a court order issued from a court 
that did not possess proper jurisdiction was void. The defendant in such case, he 
understood, was justified in refusing to comply with the unjust order. Although he 
probably would have felt better about getting a second opinion from Sawyer on the issue, 
Beck decided that he would arrest Anderson for returning to the reservation.11
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Beck expressed fears that if  he did not react quickly to Anderson’s defiance it 
might inspire others to follow his example.12 Sawyer understood that as well, but thought 
it best, for time being, that Beck observe the injunction. Although Judge Norris had 
subsequently set the trial date for December 4 at Dakota City, Nebraska, when Beck 
arrived he found that Norris had pushed the date back to the following week and planned 
to meet instead at Pender, Nebraska. On that date Sawyer appeared and presented the 
case to Judge Norris, who, having heard the evidence dismissed the action against Beck. 
Beck, in turn, had Anderson indicted by the Grand Jury and arrested for resisting the 
Indian police. Although not as spectacular as the collapse of the Flournoy resistance, the 
Agent’s latest legal victory was an important rearguard action and basically assured that 
Beck would not face the prospect of a multitude of individual suits filed by disgruntled 
ejectees.13
Only one last hurdle remained -  the mandatory injunction case, United States vs. 
Flournoy Live Stock and Real Estate Company, et al., which was still pending in the 
U. S. Circuit Court for the District of Nebraska. Included in the suit were 276 separate 
defendants. On January 7, 1896, Judge Shiras handed down his decree which Beck 
described as having “finally settle[d] the question of trespassing on Indian 
Reservations:”14
The defendants . . . [shall] be restrained and enjoined from in any manner 
interfering with the Indian Agent appointed by the President of the United States 
to control the Indians upon either the Winnebago or Omaha Reservations or both 
thereof in the discharge of his official duties touching the lands o f said 
reservations and from in any manner urging or inciting any of said Winnebago or 
Omaha Indians to lease or otherwise contract concerning any of the lands of said 
reservations without the approval o f said Indian Agent and the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior under the rules and regulations of 
the Secretary of the Interior.”15
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Breckenridge agreed with Beck, reporting that decision had given the complainants 
everything it had asked for and described Judge Shiras’ ruling as o f “the most sweeping 
nature.”16 After two and a half years o f litigation and confrontation, the contest between 
Omaha and Winnebago Indian Agent William H. Beck and the illegal settlers finally 
came to an end. Beck’s righteous persistence and tenacity in defending the rights of the 
Indians under his care finally paid off.
In his annual report to the Commissioner o f Indian Affairs for 1896, Beck 
reported that a “large quantity of land” previously held by illegal lessees had been 
recovered. Beck had either re-leased the land to legitimate settlers or the land had 
remained in the possession of the original allottees who had occupied and farmed it 
themselves. The agent reported that he had reduced the number o f Indian police on the 
agency payroll to one captain and ten privates. Beck predicted optimistically that the 
Winnebagos, having been placed in possession of their land once again, would “progress 
rapidly” in the way of farming, concluding that the Winnebagos “appear better, and are in
1 7more comfortable circumstances than they were some time ago.”
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CONCLUSION
That the Dawes General Allotment Act of 1887 was a failure of cataclysmic 
proportions is a widely accepted tenant in the historiography o f Indian-White relations. 
As an attempt to end the reservation system, the Act provided for the division of 
reservations into allotments to be assigned to individual Indians within the tribes. 
“Surplus” reservation land left over after all the authorized allotments were made, would 
be sold to eager white settlers, and the proceeds would be placed into federal bank 
accounts from which funds could be withdrawn in the future to aid in the assimilation of 
Native Americans. The selling of the so-called surplus reservation land was often the 
first step towards the increasingly rapid alienation of the tribal land base for Indians 
across the United States. A government trust period typically of 25 years was put in 
place to protect the naive Indian from being bested in his transactions with the white man. 
During that time, it was once thought, the allotted Indians would come to realize the 
benefit o f owning and working their own lands. However, land was not enough and 
without the knowledge, the equipment and the desire to adopt the white man’s farming 
ways many attempts to conform were doomed to failure. At the expiration of the trust 
period, much additional land was lost as the demoralized and impecunious Indians sold 
their failed farms to whites, which contributed to the further alienation of the Indian land 
base.
A microcosmic case study investigating the complex issues o f the leasing 
controversy on the Omaha and Winnebago Reservations during the early 1890s provides 
the insight needed to understand how the Dawes Act played a key role in alienating
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Indian lands. Many Omaha and Winnebago Indians believed that leasing their allotments 
to whites was a preferred alternative to working the land themselves. In some cases they 
were unwilling to work it themselves, and in many cases they were simply unable to do 
so because o f a lack of capital and equipment.
The ambiguous citizenship clause in the Dawes Act provided the impetus for 
many whites to reason that the allotted Indians were citizens, that their tribal relationship 
with the federal government was dissolved, and that the Indians were solely under the 
laws of the state in which they held their allotments. Many whites in northeastern 
Nebraska during the 1890s were very interested in obtaining the rich virgin lands of what 
they considered to be the former Omaha and Winnebago Reservations. Leasing the land 
relatively cheaply from Indians was for many potential settlers a much more suitable 
arrangement than outright purchase. Land speculators, or more descriptively, land 
“sharks” operating out o f nearby towns such as Pender, were especially interested in the 
possibilities, and they wasted little time in leasing most of the available land. On the 
Winnebago Reservation this included individual agreements with Indian allottees, as well 
as leases for larger amounts of unallotted tribal land, usually for periods up to five years. 
Controlling a virtual monopoly of the available land, syndicates such as the Flournoy 
Company reaped fantastic profits by sub-leasing the land to settlers at substantially higher 
rates.
First to inherit the leasing problem was Robert Ashley. He spent much of his 
tenure as agent trying to establish what his authority was, and whether or not the practice 
o f unrestricted leasing that had been established on the reservations was acceptable to the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs. Gradually it became clear that he was only to permit leasing
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under certain conditions and under the regulations set out by the Department of the 
Interior. By that time, however, illegal leasing was rampant on the reservations and the 
powerful land syndicates were firmly entrenched in their position.
These land syndicates had the firm support of the business community at Pender. 
The Penderites, especially those allied with the notorious William Peebles, were 
primarily interested in boosting theirs as the leading town in northeastern Nebraska. 
Their interests extended to include the success of the free-leasing advocates because 
cheap land on the nearby reservations would naturally attract additional settlers to the 
area. Furthermore, the syndicates’ generous “lease now, pay later” terms attracted many 
sub-lessees. By subsequently transferring their sub-lessees’ notes for future payment to 
third parties, the syndicates essentially bound the setters to the companies’ interests. 
Even if  the settlers were later evicted from their land by the agent, this would not absolve 
them from paying their debt to the new holders of their original promissory notes. 
Propaganda and calm reassurances convinced the settlers that their possession of the 
rented farms was legitimate and secure. The syndicates and Penderites combined their 
efforts against the restrictive regulations that were enforced by the agent. In the face of 
organized and influential resistance, unfortunately, Agent Ashley was unable to 
reestablish control of the leasing situation. Knowing that his three-year stint as agent was 
nearly at an end, Ashley did not make much of an effort.
That was not the case, however, with U. S. cavalry officer Captain William H. 
Beck. Having arrived at the Omaha and Winnebago Agency in the summer of 1893, the 
new agent wasted no time in assessing the situation. By the end of his first month in 
residence, he understood that whites were taking full advantage of the Indians. To his
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chagrin, he soon found his authority as agent had been undermined by the vacillation of 
his inept predecessor. His authority as agent and his jurisdiction on the reservation had 
therefore deteriorated badly even before he assumed the job. Under close consultation 
with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary o f the Interior, Beck set out to 
correct the situation and restore agency supervision on the reservations. The agent was 
firmly committed, above all else, to the protection and well-being o f the Indians under his 
charge.
His strong conviction to protect and promote the best interests o f the Indians flew 
in the face of the interests of the various individuals and land syndicates. They were 
alarmed by Beck’s attitude towards their claim to Indian land through what he referred to 
as “pretended” leases. “Free-leasing” advocates, opposed to the constraints levied by the 
regulations of the Interior Department, contested the agent’s authority and jurisdiction in 
the local courts. With the assistance of sympathetic judges and political favors, the 
illegal lessees obtained restraining orders against Beck and his Indian police to prevent 
their interference. Responding to advice by his superiors in Washington, D.C., Beck 
observed the injunctions, confident that a careful consideration o f the facts in a court o f 
law would substantiate his authority and jurisdiction. He did not anticipate the degree to 
which his free-leasing adversaries held sway in the local courts. Countless delays in the 
court system worked to the advantage of the illegal lessees who were protected by the 
injunctions. Beck was virtually helpless -  unable to act against the restraining orders and 
unable to get justice from the state courts on the issue. Eventually higher courts heard 
Beck’s appeal in the case of the Flournoy Company. The faulty logic and self-serving 
interpretations of the citizenship clause in the Dawes Allotment Act, as presented by the
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attorney for the Flournoy Company, was no longer sufficient. Despite legal vindication, 
Beck’s battle against his leasing adversaries was only just beginning.
With their legal argument denied in the Circuit Court of Appeals, the Flournoy 
Company realized that it could stall the issue by appealing the case to the Supreme Court. 
In the meanwhile, it intensified the pressure on the agent by continuing to maneuver 
behind his back and undermine his reputation in the community. Rumors, falsified 
stories, and inflammatory editorials began to appear in the local newspapers. Likewise, 
continued support of local courts and law enforcement repeatedly blocked the agent’s 
attempts at clearing the reservations of trespassers. A confrontation between Beck’s 
enlarged Indian police force and armed mobs of Penderites seemed imminent.
The grave situation attracted the attention of state congressmen who were 
probably “invited” to investigate the leasing controversy on behalf o f the Penderites. The 
Pender faction was able to predispose the congressional delegation towards the plight of 
what they falsely represented as “innocent” settlers. Poorly forged letters, purportedly 
from Indians, decried the agent’s excesses and they complained about his corrupt 
administration. Additional stories and propagandist editorials appeared in the 
newspapers calling for Beck’s dismissal, while the congressmen, completely snowballed 
by the manufactured drama of the “poor settlers,” vehemently demanded a formal 
investigation of the agency. The unfounded allegations o f corruption did not phase 
Beck’s superiors in Washington, D. C., who held steadfast in their support o f the agent.
Temporarily at least, the delay tactics of the Pender land ring were having the 
desired affect, but it did not last. By this time, the cases involving leasing and the agent’s 
jurisdiction on the reservations had become a highly inflammatory issue. This was
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especially true among citizens from the surrounding towns who, although they had no 
direct connection with the leasing or Pender, were outraged at the idea o f a corrupt agent 
taking advantage o f what was described as poor, innocent settlers. The Penderites used 
the widespread publicity o f the leasing controversy to their advantage. They attempted 
to ruin the agent’s reputation through a series o f inflammatory editorials and 
sensationalized stories. Beck was the victim o f much undeserved negative publicity as 
the Penderites sought to stir up public support against him in an attempt to have him 
removed from his position as agent. These last ditch efforts were in vain.
Beck and his legal team were able to secure favorable decisions on the injunction 
and other pending cases from courts which existed outside local jurisdiction, and which 
were far removed from political or social influence of interested third parties. This 
breakthrough proved the death blow for the Pender resistance. Once the Thurston County 
sheriff and other prominent Penderites involved in the leasing controversy were arrested, 
tried and convicted for defying the agent’s authority on the reservation, many of the 
illegal lessees decided that it was finally time to give up the charade. The Flournoy 
Company, by far the largest o f the land syndicates and the most vocal and visible 
opponent of the agent, was among the first to fold, and others quickly followed suit.
Although Beck had won the battle in the end, the land syndicates did not entirely 
lose the war. In the majority of cases, the original leases held by the companies 
originated from illegal transactions that took effect on January 1, 1891 and were set to 
expire exactly five years later. These companies realized huge profits on the illegally 
leased land for most o f this time. In the beginning, they took advantage of the chaos 
surrounding the implementation of the Dawes Act to secure pseudo-legal claims to Indian
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allotments. With the silent acquiescence of a vacillating agent who made only half­
hearted protests against their actions, the syndicates acted quickly and quietly to establish 
and consolidate their widely-recognized control over the reservations.
After Beck arrived and took charge, however, it did not take long for the free- 
leasing Pender faction to realize they would not be so fortunate in the future. As Beck 
attempted to crack down on the illegal leasing that hitherto enjoyed de facto existence on 
the reservations, the Penderites fought back in kind, tied the matter up, and dragged it out 
in local and appellate courts. Time was on their side. In the end, they had lost their legal 
case, but the court battles were a means to an end, not the actual object o f desire. It is not 
clear just how much o f the 1895 season’s rent the various syndicates recovered from their 
estranged sub-lessees, but it is certain that the previous four years of annual rents 
amounted to extremely lucrative returns on their initial investments. The profits came at 
the expense of the Indians. They lost control o f their land for up to five years, during 
which time they received little, if  any, compensation. There was no feasible means to 
recover any damages, not in a local court system that strongly favored whites over 
Indians.
The Dawes Act adversely affected the Indians’ right to their land in ways perhaps 
unobservable in too broad and inclusive of studies, as the leasing controversy on the 
Omaha and Winnebago Reservations illustrates. The relentless struggle that Indian 
Agent William H. Beck waged against the various “land sharks” and “Indian skinners” of 
the surrounding white communities also provides an example of how an honest agent can 
easily be mistaken for yet another o f those too often stereotyped corrupt agents. 
Historical investigation on a case-by-case basis o f specific reservations and their
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surrounding communities are essential to understand the full impact of legislation meant 
to “civilize” the Indians and assimilate them into mainstream culture. The reality o f such 
a complex situation often proves to be the opposite o f general appearance.
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